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Abstract
In the thesis I discuss the accommodationist claim that proportional election systems can
contribute in reducing the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict in divided societies. I contend
that if proportional systems reduce the risk of conﬂict anywhere, it is where ethnic diﬀerences
are salient  where there are severe ethnic conﬂicts to absorb into politics. I look at groups
that have large demographic power on the one hand, or are marked by high levels of negative
horizontal economic inequality on the other. I discuss a theoretical model unpacking central
mechanisms suggested by conﬂict regulation theory and comparative political science.
By the use of the rare events logistic model I ﬁnd support for my hypothesis that pro-
portional election systems reduce the risk of conﬂict for relatively large ethnic groups. I
hypothesize that economic inequality is less of a threat to peace under proportional systems
than under majoritarian. The result from regression suggest the opposite: Increasing levels
of inequality is a greater danger under proportional systems than under majoritarian.
Further, my empirical investigation gives support to previous research contending that
horizontal economic inequalities are a threat to intrastate peace. I also ﬁnd that regulations
allowing ethnic parties to compete for legislative power are associated with decline in conﬂict
risk.
Moving beyond an interpretation of coeﬃcient strength and signiﬁcance, I discover that
the marginal eﬀects of proportional election systems are close to zero, contrary to the claims
of the advocates of both majoritarianism and proportionalism regarding divided societies.
My benign test evidences that neither the majoritarian nor the proportional election system is
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Some of the most intractable and damaging intrastate armed conﬂicts are about political
and economic equality in ethnically divided societies. At the same time one of the main
determinants of how preferences in society are translated into power and policies is the elec-
toral system. The proportional vision of election systems entails dispersion of political power
between groups in society, and a common, but contested, claim is that proportional election
systems contribute in reducing the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict in divided societies. For
instance, Lijphart's recommendation is very clear: For divided societies, ensuring the elec-
tion of a broadly representative legislature should be the crucial consideration, and PR is
undoubtedly the optimal way of doing so (Lijphart 2004:100). This thesis is an empirical
investigation of implications of theories on proportional election systems as peace preserving
for ethnically divided societies.
The conception of what constitutes a divided society diﬀers between scholars of intrastate
conﬂict. I present a simple theoretical model proposing the basic concept that a proportional
election (PR) system reduces the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict where ethnic divisions are
salient. I highlight two features of ethnic groups deciding the salience of ethnic divisions:
The ethnic composition of the state  more speciﬁcally the relative sizes of groups and the
level of ethnic polarization  and the level of horizontal economic inequalities. Where these
divisions are salient, I propose, a proportional system of elections has a substantial and
negative conditional eﬀect on the probability of armed conﬂict onset. Taken together, the
mechanisms linking demographic power balance and economic inequality to conﬂict creates
a scenario where some combinations of group composition and economic inequalities increase
1
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the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict. Other combinations will be conducive to lasting peace
between ethnic groups. For example, large and economically deprived groups living under
PR systems, are hypothesized to be most at risk of armed conﬂict, whereas small and eco-
nomically privileged groups living in proportional states, will have nothing to gain from
launching rebellion against the state.
My predictions receive partial support from regression analyses, but I also ﬁnd evidence
suggesting that under some circumstances, majoritarian institutions are better at containing
conﬂict. However, the uncovered eﬀects are very small, and for some levels of independent
variable values inseparable from zero. This leads me to conclude that the conditional eﬀect
of proportional election systems on intrastate armed conﬂict is negligible. Scholars should
be cautious in universally recommending proportional systems as an outright remedy for
lasting peace.
This thesis can be placed within a large strain of research investigating how and whether
institutional arrangements can contribute to hinder the outbreak of intrastate armed con-
ﬂict between ethnic groups. In UN`s Human Development Report (Murphy and Ross-Larson
2004), it is claimed that one of the most diﬃcult and important questions of contemporary
politics is: How should societies respond to the opportunities and challenges raised by ethno-
cultural divisions, and simultaneously promote democracy, social justice, stability and peace?
Also, the global movement towards more democratic governance in the world, from the 1980s
to the still ongoing Arab Spring stimulate the search for enduring models of appropriate
representative institutions. Indeed the seismic political events of late 2010 and early 2011
have set oﬀ a wave of actual and proposed electoral reforms throughout the Middle East and
North Africa (Carey and Reynolds 2011:36).
The electoral system has long been recognized as one of the most important institutional
mechanisms for shaping the nature of political competition, because it is, to quote one
electoral authority, "the most speciﬁc manipulable instrument of politics" (Sartori 1968:273).
The question becomes which election systems are best suited for ameliorating ethnic conﬂict
between salient ethnic actors. Diﬀerently composed groups will perceive the utility of a
given electoral system diﬀerently. Posner (2004b:529-530) argues that whether or not ethnic
cleavages become politically salient depends on the sizes of the groups that it deﬁnes relative
to the size of the arena in which political competition is taking place. This logic, I argue,
applies to ethnic mobilization for armed conﬂict. If an ethnic group is large enough to
3constitute a viable coalition in competition for state power, and they are not satisﬁed with
the level of political inﬂuence achievable through peaceful means, then they might turn to
arms. Large and territoriality concentrated groups are the groups suspected to be the least
supportive of proportionality. According to the median voter theorem these groups have
more to gain in terms of political power from a majoritarian system. Smaller groups, on the
other hand, have more to gain politically from proportional representation, and will have
incentives, though not necessarily the means, to launch violent undertakings against the
state.
The link between economic (in)equality and politics has been debated for centuries. In
recent years the scholarly focus has shifted from inequality between individuals, vertical
inequality, to that between groups within society - horizontal inequality (HI). Cederman,
Weidmann, and Gleditsch presented the ﬁrst world wide statistical study of horizontal in-
equalities and civil war in 2011, investigating the relationship between economic group in-
equalities, de facto exclusion from power, and civil war. The evidence pinpointed economic
and political horizontal inequalities as factors increasing the probability of ethnonationalist
civil war.
Cederman et al. (2011) investigated politically relevant ethnic groups' de facto access to
executive power, and found that access to power was one determinant of civil war: Did the
group share power with other groups, or was it excluded altogether1? The evidence supported
their hypotheses that political HIs is associated with a higher risk of civil war; Groups that
were politically excluded were, all other things equal, much more likely to experience armed
conﬂict than the included ones. They also investigated to role of economic HIs, and showed
that the probability of civil war increased for groups with wealth levels substantially lower
or higher than the country average (Cederman et al. 2011:487-489).
What is not addressed in their article, and rarely in general in the quantitative literature
is whether de jure institutions play a part in determining the risk of war in societies with
salient ethnic divisions. This is surprising given the old and rich theoretical and comparative
traditions on the role of electoral institutions in divided societies. The study of civil war
has much to gain from bringing international relations perspectives on ethnicity, economic
perspectives, and comparative analyses of states together2. One crucial institutional deter-
1Dominant and monopoly groups were not included or discussed, since a group in these categories is the
state, and thus cannot rebel against themselves.
2See for example Kalyvas (2007).
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minant of how power is shared between ethnic groups in society is the division of political
power in the legislature. The legislative election system to a large degree decides the the po-
tential to achieve explicit representation and power in the legislature (Cohen 1997:612). The
choice between a majoritarian and a proportional election system is therefore often put forth
as the most fundamental institution in representative democracies, and the most important
choice facing constitution writers (Persson and Tabellini 2003).
Most noted in debates on proportionalism versus majoritarianism is the work of the
comparative political scientists Seymour Martin Lipset and Arend Lijphart. While the former
put forth the notion of cleavage structures in society, the latter gave name to an ideal
system of power-sharing and consensus: consociationalism. The institutional arrangements
advocated by members of the consociationalist school are multifaceted, but among them
proportionalism is the most prominent arrangement. Being considered the leading scholar of
consociationalism, Lijphart has even claimed that there is a strong scholarly consensus in
favour of these institutions for divided societies, and that there is solid empirical evidence
(Lijphart 2004:107) of their superior eﬃcacy in mitigating ethnic divisions (Lijphart 2004).
While the claim of consensus may be exaggerated, as many scholars disagree with the
view (for example Chandra (2005); Horowitz (1985; 1992; 2003); Reilly (2006); Selway and
Templeman (2009)), the arguments in favour of proportionalism over majoritarianism in
divided societies are dominant in both number and strength, and have gained some empirical
support.
Previous quantitative studies have shown that being a consociational democracy signiﬁ-
cantly reduces the incidence of ethnic civil war (Reynal-Querol 2002) and that power sharing
institutions increase the probability of lasting peace following civil war (Binningsbø 2005).
A proportional representation system in the legislature has been hypothesized and shown to
secure participation in the decision making process, and decentralization of power to reduce
tensions and contribute positively to the likelihood of lasting peace (Binningsbø 2005:22-29).
By the use of newly available data on the settlement and aﬃliations of ethnic groups, the
mapping of economic inequalities and group compositions, and nuanced and disaggregated
data on electoral institutions across the world, I am able to contribute to a this line of research
with empirical evidence. . In short, what I aim to do in this thesis, is provide a theoretical
discussion surrounding the role of proportional election systems in divided societies, and
empirical results answering the following questions:
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Do proportional election systems reduce the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict onset where
ethnic diﬀerences are salient? More speciﬁcally:
 Do PR systems reduce the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict onset where the demographic
power balance is baleful?
 Do PR systems reduce the risk of conﬂict onset that follows from economic inequality?
1.1 Deﬁnitions
In this section some of the key concepts in the thesis are deﬁned. I then provide a short
roadmap for the remainder of the thesis.
1.1.1 Ethnic groups
An ethnic group is deﬁned in accordance with the constructivist tradition after Max Weber
(1978, in Wucherpfennig et al. 2011:5); Ethnicity is a subjectively experienced sense of com-
monality based on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture(Wimmer et al. 2009:325).
Included in this deﬁnition are ethnosomatic (racial) groups, ethnolinguistic groups, and eth-
noreligious groups 3
I choose to approach ethnicity as a societal institution. Institutions are simply norms,
rules, laws and procedures that the members converge upon (for instance Abdelal et al.
(2009); Martin (2004). Then, what we are dealing with here is the overlapping or crossing of
institution membership: As member of an ethnic group, you also relate to the institutions of
the state. If the larger state institution does not present modes of behaviour and that serve
in the interest of the ethnic group, than members may come to view their membership in
the state less binding and even threatening to the institution of ethnicity.
An ethnic group is politically relevant if at least one signiﬁcant political actor claims
to represent its interest in the national political arena, or if its members are systematically
discriminated against in the domain of public politics. A signiﬁcant political actor refers to
an actor (for instance a party) that is active in the national political arena. Discrimination
is political exclusion directly targeted at an ethnic community (Wimmer et al. 2009).4
3Tribes and clans deﬁned on the bases of a conception of genealogical (family historical) commonality,
and regions without perceptions of shared ancestry, are not included in this deﬁnition (Wimmer et al. 2009).
4This deﬁnition disregards indirect discrimination based, for example, on educational disadvantage or
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1.1.2 Horizontal economic inequalities
Inequality is a multidimensional concept consisting of economic, social, political and cultural
inequalities. When such inequalities are present between communal groups within a state,
they are deﬁned as horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2008). The concept partly overlap with
what, after Lipset and Rokkan (1967) may be labelled economic and social cleavages, a
distinction I will return to in the analysis.
Economic horizontal inequality is deﬁned as diﬀerences in distribution of economic assets
and income between ethnic groups. Economic inequality is, simply put, caused by a function
of the assets one owns and the employment and productivity of those assets (Stewart and
Langer 2008:57).
1.1.3 The electoral system
The electoral system is any set of rules governing elections, more precisely how votes are
translated into political representation. Election systems are political institutions, deﬁned
here as formal rules deciding the way in which constituent preferences are translated into
legislative and executive power; They manifest the the rules of the game, as laid down
in constitutions or other laws. Throughout this thesis the concepts electoral institution
or election system always refer to these de jure institutions, the institutional setup, what
is often referred to in the literature as components of the institutional design of states5.
Institutions may be empty shells, and especially so in weak or undemocratic states, and De
jure election systems must not be thought to denote the level of actual participation and
fairness of elections, the de facto elections.
The literature in general separates between four types of electoral systems: Plurality,
majority, proportional and mixed systems. The aim of a plurality system (also called First-
past-the-post) is to create manufactured majorities. Elections are usually held in single-
member districts,where the candidate receiving the highest proportions of votes is returned
to oﬃce, and the party having the majority of representatives get to control the government:
The winner takes all (Norris 1997:299-302).
discrimination in the labour or credit markets (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011:6).
5This latter term implies the drawing up and construction of politics, which stands in contrast to the
long term process the creation and change of institutions really are. As the formation or coming to be of
institutions is only treated very brieﬂy, the term setup is more appropriate in this context
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Majoritarian systems, on the other hand, are built to secure that the winner has a
majority of votes, and not simply a plurality. This can be achieved for instance through
arranging elections in two rounds, or by the use of alternative vote systems, systematically
disfavouring parties or candidates with few votes, securing a majority of seats for the party
with the largest share of the vote.(McGary et al. 2008; Norris 1997:302).
Proportional systems are based on party lists in multi-member constituencies. The parties
are then given seats in the legislature proportionally to the number of votes they receive in
each district. The electoral formula and the size of districts vary among countries. Mixed
systems are systems where some combination of majoritarian and proportional rules are
present. For instance, in elections for the German Bundestag, there is a combination single-
member and multi-member districts (Norris 1997:303-304).
I concentrate here on a dichotomous division between majoritarian and proportional
(PR) systems of election, as these two categories are theorized to have diverging political
outcomes and thus result in diﬀerent economic and social policies. As majoritarian I deﬁne
those electoral system based on single-member plurality or majority, and as PR systems I
deﬁne both strictly proportional systems and mixed systems of election.
1.1.4 Onset of ethnic armed conﬂict
Ethnic intrastate armed conﬂicts I deﬁne as organized violent events between actors that
ﬁght with the support of an ethnic group, and the state, following the deﬁnition from Ced-
erman et al. (2011) and the standard of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂicts Database (ACD)
(Gleditsch et al. 2002). I use the terms ethnic armed conﬂict, intrastate armed conﬂict
and armed conﬂict interchangeably, and I discuss theories on both ethnic and non-ethnic in-
trastate armed conﬂict. Some intrastate armed conﬂicts are also civil wars. The mechanisms
behind minor and major conﬂicts are generally assumed the same, allowing me use theories
on civil war in building a theoretical framework in the ext chapter.
What makes these armed conﬂict ethnic is the aim of one of the organized parties; that
is, achieving ethnonationalist self-determination, a more favourable ethnic balance-of power
in government, ethnoregional autonomy, to end discrimination or other goals on behalf of
the ethnic group Wimmer et al. (2009:326).
In one sense, investigating the conditional eﬀect of election systems on probability of
intrastate armed conﬂict, is investigating the most extreme of consequences. Before the deﬁ-
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nite onset of armed conﬂict, a range of social and political outcomes may already have taken
hold, or taken its course; imagine political campaigns, riots, violence, crime or migration.
However, at the threshold where frustration over a socio-political status quo results in armed
conﬂict onset, we can distinguish between the states that to some extent succeeded in keeping
monopoly over violence and the coherence of the state, and the states who failed in fulﬁlling
their main task  to hold monopoly over violence, and to safeguard their population.
When do civil wars start? Contemporary intrastate wars are not declared, in most cases
they do not follow from a clear or oﬃcial decision to go to war. It is therefore not obvious
whether a group is in fact at war with the government. To arrive at an exclusive measure
for onset, most contemporary literature operates with a threshold of battle related deaths.
In this case I use a low threshold, as I ﬁnd that even a minor intrastate conﬂict is a clear
sign that the institutional make up of a state, among other factors, has failed to meet the
demands of all ethnic groups living within its borders. And of course, even small armed
conﬂicts have tragic consequences, far beyond the reported battle deaths.
I do not discriminate between types of ethnic conﬂicts6 in my analysis. Treating diﬀerent
types of intrastate armed conﬂicts as being similarly in terms of the eﬀect from electoral insti-
tutions is parsimonious and demands less from data. Further, whether a salient ethnic group
aims at secession or government overthrow, PR electoral systems can be argued to contribute
to mitigate conﬂicting goals, as they entail a promise of future political representation and
broader resource distribution.
In chapter 2 I present the theoretical framework, before discussing a theoretical model and
presenting hypotheses in chapter 3.
In chapter 4 I present and discuss statistical methods and operationalization of the the-
oretical model. I also provide descriptive statistics, and central bivariate and multivariate
relationships in the data.
I proceed by presenting the results from rare events regression models in chapter 5.
Interpretations of the results from the empirical analysis are presented in the last chapter.
6There are three types of ethnic conﬂict recognized in the literature: Rebellions, inﬁghting and secessionist
warfare. For a discussion see Wimmer et al. (2009:322).
Chapter 2
Theoretical framework
What are the main theoretical explanations of civil war? And what does political theorists
say about the merits of diﬀerent electoral systems for divided societies? The ﬁrst part of
this chapter gives brief answers to the question of what causes intrastate war, and a deeper
account of an institutionalist-conﬁgurative theory. Here, the role of economic inequalities
is also considered. These accounts provide a framework for discussing the role of election
systems.
In the second part of this chapter I present some reputable theoretical perspectives on
electoral systems, before turning to literature on election systems as conﬂict regulating
 these are the perspectives from which I will model theoretical expectations and testable
implications in the following chapter.
2.1 Causes of (ethnic) civil war
What causes1 civil war is a tremendously important question, and at the same time method-
ologically and theoretically demanding. Many quantitative projects have taken place during
the last decades, but theories are not always suﬃciently developed, and still there seems to
be little consensus. Especially the greed-grievance debate seems intractable.
One might separate three main strains of theoretical explanations of civil war common in
statistical research: 1) The greed-and-opportunity perspective 2) the diversity-breeds-conﬂict
1Using the term cause I adhere to the notion of probabilistic causality, and hence do not refer to any
necessary or suﬃcient factors producing civil war, but rather the idea that the presence of a cause should
raise the probability of intrastate armed conﬂict. See for instance Eells (1991).
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tradition and, 3) the minority-mobilization school. In addition to this Wimmer, Cederman,
and Min (2009) proposes a fourth approach, an institutionalist-conﬁgurative perspective of
ethnicity and civil war.
Below I give a very brief outline of main theories and ﬁndings from these perspectives,
before providing a more full account of the theory of Wimmer et al. (2009). I then discuss
shortly the usefulness of these perspectives in the context of my research question.
2.1.1 Greed and opportunity theory
Greed and opportunity theory claims that conditions that favour insurgency is what makes
up the main determinants of conﬂict. In particular state weakness, marked by poverty, large
populations and instability, predicts countries' proneness to conﬂict.
As proponents for the greed-and opportunity perspective two of the most referenced
articles and frameworks within the civil war literature should be mentioned, one by Fearon
and Laitin (2003) and the other one Collier and Hoeer (2004). Fearon and Laitin (2003),
testing the implications of what they label perennialist and modernist arguments ﬁnd no
empirical support for the claim that ethnic diﬀerences increase the likelihood of conﬂict.
Collier and Hoeer (2004) also investigate and ﬁnd support for an opportunity based
explanation for civil war, showing that factors aﬀecting the opportunity for rebellion are
availability of ﬁnances, the cost of rebellion, and military advantages such as a dispersed
population. They ﬁnd little evidence to support grievance-based2 explanations.
2.1.2 Diversity as a cause of war?
The diversity breeds conﬂict - tradition emphasize ethnic heterogeneity as a cause of ethnic
conﬂict. The main claim within this tradition is that the more ethnically fragmented a society
is, the more conﬂicts we will see along ethnic lines.
According to Sambanis (2001) a motive for ethnic rebellion is preservation of one`s ethnic
identity. More importantly, he says, is the reduction of collective action problems associated
with shared identity.
2The term grievance is much used in the literature. Grievances are associated with a deprivation of
basic needs of some sort, claims of rights based on identity, react to discrimination(Arnson and Zartman
2005:262). I employ the term as a bag of factors; It hence contains the more speciﬁc factors of horizontal
economic inequalities, discrimination, deprivation, painful histories of the group and so on.
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A quite diﬀerent explanation is Vanhanen`s socio-biological theory of ethnic nepotism.
Vanhanen draws on Darwin`s theory of natural selection, and promotes the idea that ethnic
group members support each other in order not to be left out in the struggle for survival of
one`s kin. People tend to favour their group members over non-members because they are
more related to their group members than to the remainder of the population (Vanhanen
1999:57). From this reasoning he derives the hypothesis that the more diﬀerent ethnic
groups are from each other (for instance the less genetically related they are), the higher is
the probability and intensity of conﬂict between them.
2.1.3 Minorities mobilize?
The minority- mobilization school, is largely equivalent to the work of Gurr (1970; 1993)
and colleagues, who shifted the focus from the state to the group level in investigating ethnic
conﬂicts. Gurr emphasizes the strength of ethnic grievances and the political opportunity
structure for rebellion provided by diﬀerent political regimes (Gurr 1993).
The minority approach draws on explanations developed by social psychologist. Gurr
theorizes that relative deprivation leads to frustration. He states that the value capabilities
of a collectivity are the average value positions, how much of some good, its members perceive
themselves capable of attaining or maintaining(Gurr 1970:27). If this value potential is low,
whether actual value position is low or not, people will be frustrated.
Gurr and Moore (1997) investigated the claims of the perspective empirically by the use
of the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data (Gurr 1993), which can be seen as an improvement over
earlier datasets, due to its capturing of group level-factors. The authors found that group
inequalities have an indirect positive eﬀect on the likelihood of ethno-political rebellion.
Why should frustration over deprivation3 trigger violent behaviour and civil war? The
explanation put forth by Gurr build on psychological theories stating that negative aﬀect,
such as frustrations, can trigger ﬁght responses. The response chosen in such instances
depends on surrounding circumstances (Berkowitz 1962). In the case of horizontal inequality,
whether or not people ﬁght would hence be determined by both the level of frustration felt,
and by assessments of the speciﬁc situation and opportunity-cost of rebellion.
3Relative deprivation is generally equated with grievance in the ethnic politics literature (se for instance
Arnson and Zartman 2005). I use (relatively) deprived restrictively as synonymous to being (part of) the
under-privileged group in a state characterized by HIs
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2.1.4 The institutionalist-conﬁgurative perspective
We now see a renewed attention to economic inequalities as a cause of civil war, and several
authors have given evidence that inequalities between ethnic groups increases the risk of civil
war. Where earlier studies focusing on individual inequality failed to prove that inequalities
matter, the newer projects focus on horizontal inequality. This research agenda is based
on an institutionalist-conﬁgurational (IC) perspective, after Wimmer, Cederman, and Min
(2009).
The IC framework`s proximity to the minority-mobilization perspective is evident in it`s
focus on group features, and it's emphasis on the political environment of groups. This is
it`s conﬁgurational part, aiming to explain when we can expect ethnic politics to lead to
armed violence (Wimmer et al. 2009:320). However, while the minority perspective is rather
narrowly focused on features of groups, the IC approach incorporates distribution of state
power, the conditions under which political preferences run along ethnic lines. This is the
institutional part: the speciﬁc conditions surrounding a group. As Wimmer et al. (2009) put
it: ethnic politics is not exclusively a struggle to rectify the grievances of minority groups
[. . . ] but it is more generally and fundamentally about the distribution of state power along
ethnic lines (Wimmer et al. 2009:317).
The nationstate can be described as relying on ethnonational principles of political legiti-
macy, and is often ruled in the name of an ethnically deﬁned people. Rulers should therefore
be expected to take care of their own. This is the concept of ethnic politics : the struggle
over control over the state between ethnically deﬁned actors (Wimmer et al. 2009:321). Ac-
cordingly, some conditions are deemed conducive to the alignment of political loyalties along
ethnic lines. Especially when the nationstate relies on ethnonational principles of political
legitimacy, or the state is ruled in the name of an ethnically deﬁned people, the incentives
of rulers is to underline ethnicity and take special care of the ethnic group to which they
belong. In practice this can take the form of choices to distribute resources in a manner
favouring the group, the adoption of laws that correspond to the norms and culture of the
group, and granting access to bureaucratic and decision-making power for those of ethnic
kin (Wimmer et al. 2009).
Examples of the parliament becoming the ground for ethnic contest, after a capturing
of control over parliament by one ethnically dominant group, are incidents of democracy
breakdown in African states: Outnumbered oppositions have been left with violence as the
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only route towards political inﬂuence. It can be argued that this is what happened with the
with the Ibo in Nigeria (1970), the Muslims in Chad(1965), the southerners in Sudan (1955
and 1983) (Horowitz 1992), and the Northerners in Cote d'Ivoire (2002) (Langer 2005).
2.2 Discussion of theories and recent evidence
The researchers within the Greed and opportunity school have made great contributions to
the ﬁeld of conﬂict studies; Not only have they provided substantial knowledge of the role of
economies in civil conﬂict, they have also contributed in sharpening the methodological tools
used for empirical investigation. Still, the literature can be criticized regarding the conception
of ethnic politics and grievance. For instance, the operationalization of ethnic grievances
in terms of fractionalization can be claimed not to capture the role of ethnicity in politics.
As Wimmer et al. (2009:318) articulates it: Not all ethnic groups matter for politics, and
hence more fractionalization does not automatically imply more political conﬂict. Further,
economic inequality in terms of vertical inequality is not a valid measure of ethnic grievances,
as there is no saying whether deprivations and privileges run along ethnic lines.
We saw in section 2.1.2 how ethnicity has been interpreted in terms of diversity; a con-
tention that diﬀerences and cultural antagonism should lead to violence between ethnic
groups. These claims of the Diversity breeds conﬂict tradition can be criticized for being
deterministic and too general. As Posner (2004b:529) puts it: The mere presence of cultural
diﬀerences cannot possibly be a suﬃcient condition for the emergence of political or social
strife, for there are far more cultural cleavages in the world than there are conﬂicts.
The minorities-mobilize perspective, I claim, provide a more compelling story of ethnic
conﬂict. It lends attention to how inequalities between groups, and not simply ethnic diﬀer-
ences by on of itself, produce incentives for civil warfare. The approach also considers, not
only the opportunity to exploit diﬀerences for economic gain, but also the ethnic group as a
marker for economic and social status, and the inherent potential for conﬂict between those
privileged and those not.
Further, the contention of the minority-perspective that grievances generate frustration
is supported by socio-psychological experiments. One example is an experimental study
performed by Shaykhutdinov and Bragg (2011). They ﬁnd that individuals who experience
higher levels of grievance show higher levels of frustration. In their experiment participants
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are ﬁrst deprived of a good4 that is considered important for their identity. They are then
asked to indicate their frustration levels on a scale. Not surprisinlgy, the result is a higher
average level of frustration between individuals whose good have been reduced.
A major critique of the minority-approach, however, is the neglectful treatment of the
ethnic groups in demographic majority; the choice not to theorize the role of such groups
leaves a gap in the the theory. More speciﬁcally, the state will be treated as a neutral actor
if the group in power is an ethnic majority, a premise that is not reasonable, as a state
captured by one ethnic group will be lenient to promote policies favouring that group. A
related problem is the failure to account for majority groups in opposition, excluded from
political power. These groups may also be frustrated and turn to warfare. The source of
civil war cannot be illuminated by looking at only some of the ethnic parties to a conﬂict.
The perspective of Wimmer, Cederman, and Min is the more useful starting point for
further theorizing in the context of this thesis, since it incorporates insights from both
opportunity- and grievance based perspectives. My further reasoning is heavily indebted to
this perspective. Opportunity based explanations and insights concerning the mobilizations
of minorities will also be incorporated and modelled.
How then are group incentives or frustrations translated into civil war? What makes
a whole group of people support a dangerous rebellion? The question of collective action
and mobilization are treated only swiftly in Wimmer et al.'s (2009) presentation of the
IC approach, focusing mainly on power constellations. In section 2.1.3 we saw how the
minorities-mobilize perspective provides leverage in explaining these mechanisms: the sum
of frustration and low opportunity-costs make deprived groups rebel5. Assuming that groups
are unitary and rational6, groups attain a higher value to having power and wealth then the
opposite. They try to overcome their low status by the use of available means, one of which
may be warfare.
The goal of a deprived group and the corresponding means may be products of intellec-
tual ideas, material position, emotions and group psychology. War is rational if the cost of
it is outweighed by the probability of achieving a better future for one's group and future
4The good removed is the football team of Texas University, which is ﬁrst shown to be valued highly by
the university students.
5Another important feature in this respect, group coherence, can be explained partly by an ability to
punish defectors. The shorter the distance to a member of the rebellion, the less beneﬁt the leader of the
rebellion has to promise (Gates 2002).
6By rationality I simply mean the human ability to have complete and transitive preferences (McCarty
and Meirowitz 2007)
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generations. Accepting a position of powerlessness is rational if the alternative is costly de-
feat by a resourceful incumbent, leaving your group and your family in even deeper despair
than at present. This reasoning is in line with bargaining models of war, where asymmetric
information and commitment problems are proposed mechanisms (Fearon 1995). If frustra-
tion is a result of inequality, then the removal of the inequality is a rational solution. If no
peaceful means are available, then violence comes to play.
The propositions of the IC perspective, and questions regarding the role of horizontal
inequalities in intrastate armed conﬂict, have in recent years been subject to quantitative
investigation.
In a study from 2006, Østby addresses the interplay between socio-economic and iden-
tity-related factors in civil conflict, using data from surveys in developing countries7. Østby
also asks whether HIs are particularly conﬂict provoking under certain political conditions.
While she ﬁnds little support for a hypothesis that political exclusion alone increases the
risk of civil war, she does discover a strong interaction between political exclusion and eco-
nomic inequality. This suggests that societies experiencing economic inequality in tandem
with political exclusion are particularly conﬂict prone. Østby's (2006) study incorporates
only developing countries, and is based on health surveys. The number of responses for
some ethnic groups may be very low, and there is hence no guarantee that the sample is
representative. Another concern is the potential response bias attached to survey data, due
to respondents, consciously or unconsciously, making overstatements or understatements re-
garding their social or economic situation. The results are therefore not deﬁnite and are
amenable for further research.
The ﬁrst worldwide study of HIs and its eﬀect on civil war was conducted and presented
by Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch in 2011. The authors put forth, among others,
the hypothesis that economic HIs increase the risk of civil war. They disaggregate their
research to the group level. By the help of geographically coded data on politically relevant
ethnic groups and spatial wealth estimates they discover that in societies where HIs are
considerable, both the relatively richer and poorer groups are more likely to engage in violent
conﬂict against the state. They also ﬁnd evidence that political HIs (exclusion from executive
power) is associated with a higher risk of civil war(Cederman et al. 2011:487-492).
The literature seems to be moving towards a convergence on deeming HIs a factor increas-
7DHS data
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ing the risk of civil war in divided societies. What is not addressed in the mentioned studies,
is the role of speciﬁc institutions designed to overcome economic and political inequalities.
Neither do they present precise theoretical models including features of the group and the
eﬀect of these on the opportunity cost of intrastate armed conﬂict. As for the latter, I merge
the logic from Posner (2004a) and Wimmer et al. (2009), and propose that the relative sizes
of group, and their economic status quo are main determinants for decisions to mobilize
against the state. Regarding the former, a rich literature provides a range of propositions.
How do electoral institutions generally perform under conditions of horizontal inequalities
and salient diversity? In states characterized by both economic HIs along ethnic lines, and
a division of power between ethnic groups we should perhaps expect more peace than in
states where HIs are present both in the economic and the political dimension. Or do some
other mechanism come into play when these two inequalities meet? What role does the
demographic power balance of groups play? Can speciﬁc political institutions, in this case
features of the electoral system, disturb the chain from frustration to civil war? In the
next section I ﬁrst give a brief outline of the theoretical debate on majoritarianism versus
proportionalism in divided societies, before I proceed by articulating the debate on the role
of election systems as a means to conﬂict regulation.
2.3 Electoral systems in ethnically divided societies
There are two well-developed theoretical approaches as to the eﬀect of electoral systems in
divided societies, useful in the context of this analysis. These lines of thought both orig-
inate from democracy theory, indebted to Schumpeter (2008), and the legacy of modern
political thinkers such as Dahl (1989), Lipset (1960) and Tingsten and especially Lijphart
(1979; 1999; 2004). One line of research is that of democracy as contest, and theoreti-
cal models on majoritarian and proportional visions of democracy. The other is that of
conﬂict regulation theory, the question of how to organize political institutions, especially
in war-torn or conﬂict-prone states. The most established line of research on political in-
stitutions is comparative politics, focusing on the political outcomes of institutions. This
tradition emphasize accountability and representativeness as desirable attributes of political
systems. The discussion of how these two attributes should be balanced is the foundation
from which theoretical concerns over appropriate democratic setups has been build (Persson
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and Tabellini 2003:12); a discussion that by and large can be summarized as one between
majoritarianism and proportionalism.
The conception, and normative ideal, of democracy as inherently competitive has, and is,
subject to a variety of criticisms, but with little doubt it is the most applicable and minimal
model of how democracy works8 (Strøm 1992:32-35).
Within the democracy as contest tradition, there are two approaches as old as the
world (Tocqueville 2003 [1835]), to elections and democratic contest. These are visions of
democracy reﬂecting diverging goals; Concentration of power and control of decision makers,
versus dispersion of political power and the allowance of shifting policy coalitions. Diﬀerently
stated: The two primary types of constitutional designs in contemporary democracies can
be understood as having election rules that reﬂect either the majoritarian or proportional
vision (Powell 2000:4).
The majoritarian vision entails both a normative claim and an empirical hypothesis.
The eﬀectiveness of a majority government is the most important normative criterion among
proponents of majoritarian democracy. The creation of manufactured majorities makes the
election results decisive for the outcome, as there is no need for post-election negotiations
when one party hold the majority of seats (Norris 1997:304). Majoritariansim also creates
an identiﬁable link between the electorate and the government, ensuring that governments
can be held accountable and punished in the subsequent election if it adopts policies not
appreciated by the citizens (Norris 1997:304-305).
The empirical hypothesis is the median voter theorem (Hotelling 1929; Downs 1957). It
states that in competitions over votes, the party that appeals to the median voter will be the
victor in elections, assuming single peaked preferences9 and a one-dimensional policy space10.
Politicians' knowledge of the power of the median voter encourages them to advocate and
pursue moderate politics. This is the reasoning behind the contention many share with
Lipset (1960); Majoritarian systems cause moderate politics.
The proportional vision is producing parliaments that better reﬂect the composition of
the electorate (Norris 1995). PR systems therefore are more fair to minor parties, other-
wise excluded from the possibility of forming government (Norris 1997:305). The advocates
8That said, conceptions of democratic competition are not uniform. See for instance Marks and Diamond
(1992) for discussions.
9Voters have one ideal point fr policy, and the utility of the adopted policy declines with equal rate for
deviation form ideal policy in both direction.
10There is only one conﬂict dimension in society  and this conﬂict runs along ethnic lines.
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of proportional systems hold the process of conciliation and coalition-building within gov-
ernment, and policies based on consensus, as major goals for the electoral system (Norris
1997:310).
A PR electoral institution makes way for the formation of a multi-party system, and
they are also associated with what Lijphart (1999) labels  `cross-community power-sharing
executives. As the proportion of votes needed to be elected into parliament decreases, the
number of parties generally increase, and the possibility of political representation increases
for smaller ethnic groups. A majoritarian election system, on the other hand, tends to
produce two-party systems, from which minority candidates will often be excluded (Lijphart
2004; 1999). Duverger's Law (Duverger 1963) explains why majoritarian election systems
favours a two-party system with larger and independent parties as a consequence of two
parallel eﬀects, where the ﬁrst is a mechanical eﬀect that causes the second, third, fourth,
and so forth, placed parties to receive a much smaller number of seats in parliament compared
to their share of the vote, beneﬁting the largest party disproportionately. The second eﬀect is
psychological; Potential voters for smaller parties give their vote to one of the larger parties
for tactical reasons, so that their vote is not lost (Vatter 2003:447).
2.3.1 PR systems and ethnic conﬂict
Clear recommendations regarding electoral systems as a means to conﬂict regulation are
frequent in the literature, and they are not unison. For instance is majoritarian democracy
viewed by many as a superior kind of democracy (Hartzell et al. 2001), and was considered
the best choice for most of the former British colonies after independence (Lijphart 1999:10).
At the same time PR systems are often advocated by scholars of conﬂict regulation theory.
Lijphart's theory of consociationalism has been widely inﬂuential in shaping these debates,
and particularly the one concerning what is the most appropriate electoral arrangements to
adopt in divided societies (Norris 2008). While the arguments in favour of majoritarianism
are compelling, the claim of a peace preserving eﬀect of proportionalism in divided societies
resonate with the my theoretical framework. Recent empirical research also suggest that
proportionalism might be the more peace promoting alternative. In this section I present
the key points of dissent in the debate on proportional election systems and its mitigating
eﬀects, and I will argue that the arguments in favour of proportionalism are more compelling
than those in disfavour.
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When discussing the eﬀect of the electoral system on intrastate peace, I am leaping over
the intermediate steps of political outcomes of elections and the diﬀerent policies produced
by these various types of government. Two theoretical predictions discussed in the above
section is important in this context. Firstly, PR election systems produce inter-party cooper-
ation and coalition governments, while majoritarian systems produce two-party systems and
majority governments, and therefore exclude some ethnic groups form political power alto-
gether. The prediction concerning policies produced is that we will observe less spending on
broad programs under majoritarian election systems than under PR systems. Majoritarian
electoral competition discourages public-good provision in favour of targeted redistribution
(Persson and Tabellini 2003:30). In other words, we can expect more distribution across eth-
nic lines in PR systems, both politically and economically. This will reduce ethnic tension
and competition.
Conﬂict regulation theory is one label for the line of research investigating and rec-
ommending institutional and political solutions11 for divided societies. Within this line of
research there are two main strains of thought: integration and accommodation. Integra-
tionists have as their preamble the nation-state and the rights of the individual. Collective
diversity and national, ethnic and cultural diﬀerences, are to be left to the private realm;
Ethnic diﬀerences should not be reﬂected in party politics. They favour majoritarian elec-
tion systems, and state-wide parties, producing parliamentary systems based on majoritarian
principles (McGary et al. 2008:45-50).
Accommodationists hold as their leading star the plurinational state, and the rights of
both individuals and groups. Cultural diﬀerences should be accommodated through laws
and institutions. They propose power sharing in the executive, proportional election system
and acceptance of ethnic or sub-state parties (McGary et al. 2008:51-67).
Horowitz (2003), belonging to the integrationist strain, is one of the major critics of
proportionalism. He supports the notion that choices of one electoral system or another
involves a decision about what goals decision-makers wish to foster, but is critical to the
goals fostered by PR systems, on the ground that they may contribute in producing polarized
pluralism (after Sartori 1976), and less moderate candidates than majoritarian systems. 12.
11We might picture the debate on institutions in divided societies as residing on a continuum of systemic
responses to ethnic conﬂicts; from full assimilation to partition of the state (McGary et al. 2008).
12Horowitz (1992; 2003) proposes design of various electoral mechanisms as a better alternative for en-
couraging the election of moderate representatives, and hence reduce the tension associated with cleavages
between communal groups. Horowitz's (2003) alternative vote(AV) system has been much debated, but has
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Horowitz's (2003) main quality determinant of an election systems is whether or not it
leads to moderate politics. Majoritarian elections encourage moderate politicians and party
politics. The winner in PR elections, on the other hand, may be moderate or not, exactly
because the whole thrust of PR is to represent all opinions, regardless of their position
on the political spectrum (Horowitz 2003:122). The view held by Horowitz is a common
theoretical concern over proportional systems of elections; That such systems may spark
violence in the circumstance of ethnically divided societies. Proportional elections can lead
to an ethnicization and polarization of politics. The public institutional recognition of group
identities that a PR system could entail may add fuel to the ﬁre. As more or less populous
groups in society get the opportunity to form parties and have their voices heard in the
parliament, we will see more centrifugal party systems, with ethnic and religious parties
on extreme policy positions. Such parties and their agendas could exacerbate ethnic and
economic conﬂicts and thus threaten the state. A majoritarian election system, on the other
hand, favours (non-ethnic) state wide parties. It is a type of system ensuring parties to
cross-cut religious and ethnic alignments and induce stability.
Lipset (1960:90), also advocating an integrationist view, argues that potentially danger-
ous overlapping cleavages can be dealt with through promoting state wide party organizations
under a two-party system13.
Others recommend a banning of ethnic parties to hinder political polarization (Teshome
2008). In many contemporary African democracies, some post-communist countries in East-
ern Europe, and Asian countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey and Algeria, ethnic, religious
and regional parties are illegal (Basedau et al. 2007:617). The bans on ethnic parties may
be a response to various challenges, but, as documented from African countries, the most
important reason is often to avoid ethnic conﬂicts and wars (Teshome 2008:797).
An accommodationist qualiﬁcation to the concern over ethnic parties, is, as suggested
by Chandra (2005), that ethnic parties may be more stable than other types of parties since
the elites that hold the leadership of the party belong to the same ethnic group. Democratic
stability should therefore not be challenged by ethnic parties14.
only been implemented once  Fiji tried this systems, and according to Lijphart, the collapse of this regime
in 2000 proved the inability of AV to moderate ethnic politics (Lijphart 2002).
13In cross-cutting societies individuals will be pulled among their various memberships such that loyalty to
any one group will be minimized. Cross-cutting cleavages create mechanisms for consensus, while overlapping
cleavages must be dealt with explicitly in the political system (Lipset 1960:88-92). See also Gubler and Selway
(2012) for an empirical investigation.
14See Birnir (2006); Gunther and Diamond (2001); Chandra (2007) for further discussion of ethnicity and
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Carey and Reynolds (2011), criticising advocates of majoritarianism, contend that elec-
tions should avoid the danger of a large winner's bonus' whereby the biggest party or
coalition receives a share of seats that far outstrips its share of the popular vote (Carey and
Reynolds 2011:37).
This argument resonates with Lijphart's claim the answer for ethnically divided societies
is consociational democracy15, and in particular proportional election systems (Lijphart 2004;
1979). In Lijphart's consociational model there are three key regulating institutional features:
1) A cross-community power-sharing executive 2) Proportionality in the public sector (in
the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and other elite levels) often induced through PR
systems of elections, and 3) community self-government (Lijphart 1979:501).
The consociational institutional set-up, after Lijphart's mould has often been recom-
mended but is, however, rarely seen in it's pure form16, and never in the world regions most
plagued by civil war. Assuming Lijphart's theory catches the essence, the more consocia-
tional a system is, the more viable may an absorption of conﬂicts into politics be. In other
words, we will observe less civil war onsets in states where the speciﬁc trait of consociation-
alism - a proportional election system - is present, than where power sharing institutions are
absent.
We see that various claims over the merits of election systems are contested and have
sometimes proved controversial. There is, as Ginsburg (2012:4) puts it, less consensus on
the major issues of institutional design than might be hoped, and systematic quantitative
evidence has been lacking to test the evidence for some of the core contentions of theorized
eﬀects of electoral systems (Norris 2008:Chapter 5). Also, the belief in the existence of some
one-size ﬁts all system is mostly abandoned in institutional theory (for instance Bakke and
Wibbels 2006:2), a point that is highlighted in this thesis; The ﬁt of an electoral systems
depends on the mode and the depth of ethnic cleavages.
The question must be, as pointed out in the introduction: Which electoral systems are
the most peace-promoting for salient ethnic diﬀerences, as they appear in the form of relative
demographic power? Trusting the claim that The choice of electoral system can eﬀectively
determine who is elected and which party gains power (Reynolds et al. 2005:5), the other
electoral politics
15Confusingly, Lijphart equates power sharing democracy with consociational systems in the article from
2004. However I stick with his earlier, and more strict deﬁnition discussed below.
16Switzerland, Belgium and the European Union are, according to Lijphart, the only instances that ap-
proximate the pure model.
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important question regards economic inequality and electoral systems: If deprived groups
are empowered by means of the system of elections, are peaceful resolutions of conﬂicts more
likely?
Though the quantitative evidence on this topic is meagre, recent studies are suggesting
that proportionality might be the better option for divided societies. Reynal-Querol (2001)
shows formally that proportional, inclusive, systems have a lower probability of intrastate
armed conﬂict than majoritarian systems, due to the higher opportunity costs of rebellion
associated with political inclusion (Reynal-Querol 2001:4). Empirically, she discovers that
the more inclusive the system, the smaller the probability of civil war (Reynal-Querol 2001).
Østby (2006) follows the reasoning of Horowitz (2003) and hypothesize that the conﬂict
potential of socio-economic HIs increases with more inclusive electoral systems. She does
however not ﬁnd support for this claim, indicating that proportionalism is no threat to peace.
Others, testing the conditional eﬀects of election systems, ﬁnd support for PR systems
being the better option in divided societies. The conclusion in Schneider and Wiesehomeier
(2008:198) is that especially ethnic fractionalization and polarization combined with ma-
joritarian voting rules make civil war more likely. However, these results must be treated
with some caution due to potential methodological weaknesses17.
My theoretical framework based on the IC perspective, contends that one of the main
challenges to peaceful coexistence in ethnically and economically divided societies is the
capturing of control of the state by one or a few ethnic groups. Controlling the state means
controlling resource allocation and investment. Combined with the ability to enact policies
in the cultural and social domains, the state may turn into an instrument for achieving
group goals rather than population goals. The modern state can therefore be perceived by
its citizens, not as a neutral actor, but as captured by ethnic groups, and as an actor biased
towards securing the long-term and short term interests of the groups in power. The political
contest for state power can therefore under some circumstances be perceived as a zero-sum
game between groups18 (Fjelde and Østby 2012; Wimmer et al. 2009). A proportional election
system take the edge oﬀ this contest.
Claims regarding violent ethnic competition over power have been well assessed in case
17Their conclusions are based on suspiciously large coeﬃcients from regression analysis.
18This point is made explicit in theories on neo-patrimonialism in African states, where the political leader
do not separate state and household economy, and were her ethnic group is treated as an extended family`
(see Dokken 2008).
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based research. For instance Spears (2000) studied how exclusion of political parties aﬀected
the prospects for peace in the wake of the Arusha Accords in Rwanda in 1993. The process
to build a new and power sharing government failed to include the extremist Hutus, which
produced an unstable situation, followed by the massive genocide in 199419. The genocide
has been interpreted as the culmination of long standing ethnic competition and tensions
between the minority Tutsi, who had controlled power for centuries, and the majority Hutu
peoples, who had come to power in the rebellion of 1959-62. Spears conclude that the
case of Rwanda shows that the threat of a net loss in power may force extremists to take
violent preventative action (Spears 2000:110). This case-based evidence gives support for
the proportional system allowing broad inclusion of ethnic parties in legislative elections.
Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the 1990s, is another example of how salient ethnicities and the
lack of political representation resulted in violent group mobilization (Langer 2005). Here the
presence of political and economic horizontal inequalities formed an explosive situations. The
excluded political elites had strong incentives to mobilize along ethnic lines to ﬁght ethnic
discrimination forced by the majoritarian government, and gaining support from their ethnic
group was easy (Langer 2005:44). Commenting the Ivorian struggles Langer (2005:39) states
that a more ethnically equal distribution of government positions is likely to improve ethnic
groups' perceptions and attitudes towards a political regime.
In light of the theoretical discussion on causes of ethnic armed conﬂicts, the strong
arguments in favour of proportional systems, and the cases brieﬂy visited, I ﬁnd the claim
that proportional election systems are better apt for ethnically divided societies compelling.
The power sharing that comes with PR systems ensures policies beneﬁt not only one ethnic
group (in power), but work in the interest of a broader segment of society, and sometimes
for the society as a whole. These are main claims in theory advocating PR election systems
as conﬂict reducing mechanisms.
However, conﬂict is not ripe in all ethnically divided societies, as the IC perspective high-
lights, but more so where motives and opportunities are present. Indeed most theoretical
explanations of civil war stress the importance of not only motives, such as reducing inequal-
ity, but also opportunities and expected utilities from engaging in warfare. If the latter is
not present  if there is little chance of intrastate conﬂict in the ﬁrst place then it does not
make sense to speak of any conﬂict reducing eﬀect of electoral systems.
19Estimates of the death toll have ranged from 500,000 - 1,000,000, or as much as 20% of the country's
total population.
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In this chapter I have presented a general theoretical framework, and I now highlight one
particular claim from the IC perspective; The claim that the risk of civil war increases with
higher levels of inequality, and where the composition of groups is particularly baleful. If
there is any peace preserving eﬀect of PR systems, then it should be visible under such cir-
cumstances. However, the presented theoretical frameworks and arguments are overarching
and general and hence not amenable to empirical investigation as is. In the next chapter,
investigating the the IC framework and the belief in proportional systems as peace promot-
ing for ethnically divided societies, I develop a more speciﬁc, and narrow, theoretical model
leading to falsiﬁable claims.
Chapter 3
Theoretical expectations
In this chapter I derive speciﬁc expectations about the ameliorating eﬀects of proportional
election systems in states with salient ethnic cleavages  where baleful group compositions
and horizontal economic inequality exist. I arrive at observable implications and present four
hypotheses. I also present regression functions containing the parameters that are implied
by the hypotheses  the parameters that will be operationalized in the next chapter.
If electoral systems are decisive for political representation and inclusion as discussed in
the previous chapter, the theorized risk of civil war that horizontal inequalities present, will
be aﬀected by the ability of the electoral system to steer societal conﬂicts into competitions
for political power. The same goes for volatile ethnic compositions. In divided societies,
then, electoral processes need to result in an incorporation of politically relevant ethnic
groups into the legislature in order to contain conﬂicts within the peaceful political domain.
The election system more apt to accomplish this, I contend, is a proportional system.
3.1 A theoretical model
Since the tripartite relationship between group features, electoral system and intrastate
armed conﬂict now becomes complex, I turn to discussing a simple theoretical model. I
approach it as an adaptation and development of the modelling in Reynal-Querol's (2001)
paper, and its primary purpose is heuristic. I present it for perceptual leverage and clarity
in my further reasoning. Of course this is a simpliﬁcation of the real-world relationships.
The aim is presenting speciﬁc observable implications that follow from the chosen theories
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of civil war and electoral institutions, allowing for precise evaluation of the data. Limiting
assumptions are always necessary in order to put forth theoretical hypotheses. Regarding
theory as a semantic tool1, I develop theoretical models consisting of plausible and empirically
supported mechanisms. I will return to a discussion of the limitations and consequences of
the theoretical model in chapter 6.
Following the implications of the IC perspective and its focus on the combination of
institutional and conﬁgurational factors, the utility of a group can be simpliﬁed to a function
of their economic status, the ethnic composition and the institutional setup, all else equal.
Denoting a group's utility u, the institutional setup θ, the economic status γ and the size of
the group ζ, the utility of a group can be written as the function:
ui = f(θ), γ, ζ + ) (3.1)
u(θ, γ, ζ, ) (3.2)
where i denotes any group in the set of politically relevant groups G, and  is a parameter
of unknown societal and group features that may aﬀect how the current political-economic
status is perceived.
I have already deﬁned two types of election systems, majoritarian (θMaj) and propor-
tional (θPR). The median voter theorem states that in a majoritarian system the policy
implemented will be the one chosen by the median voter m (after Reynal-Querol 2001:9).
I let α denote the set of policies implemented, and α∗m is the most preferred policy of the
median voter.
αθmaj = α∗m, (3.3)
In a proportional system the policy chosen will be the sum of the product of group preferences
and group share in the population. Note that to by assuming the group as a whole have
particular and common preferences, we also view legislative elections as elections by census
in which each group's share of the electorate is closely reﬂected in the votes going to each
1Assumptions and theory can be viewed in terms of their usefulness for the purpose of deriving testable
hypotheses concerning the research question (see for instance Morton 1999; Clarke and Primo 2007).
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political party (Horowitz 1985:326). I also assume that preferences are linear in policy space2.








where α∗i is any group in G`s most preferred set of policies. Put diﬀerently the national
policy implemented is a function of the election system, and the relative sizes of groups in a
country,
α = m(θ, ζ). (3.5)
The net utility v for a group of a particular policy is the diﬀerence between a group's most
preferred policy, α∗, and any prevailing policy:
vi = −|α− α∗|, (3.6)
Following the median voter theorem and the PR theorem vi will be smaller for small
groups under majoritarian systems than under PR systems. For large groups, vi should be
smaller under PR, as a large group will be able to decide the policy solely under majori-
tarianism. The exclusive features of majoritarian election systems, may be costly for the
smaller groups. Not only can excluded groups be negatively aﬀected by the targeted redis-
tribution (that is, they are not targeted), they may also experience a limitation in access
to political leaders and power holders, to important information and most importantly, to
any inﬂuence in determining policies and priorities. In addition, excluded groups can feel
suspicious towards their political leaders, a suspicion that they will be discriminated against
(Hartzell et al. 2001:186). More dramatically, as Lijphart (1985:18-19) puts it: "Minorities
that are excluded from power will probably remain excluded and will almost inevitably lose
their allegiance to the regime (Lijphart 1985:18-19).
The utility for a group is, however, not decided by policies alone. Inserting the net utility
of a policy into the ﬁrst equation we get the utility of a group as a sum of 1) the net utility
of the policy and 2) a function of their relative economic position and all other things
2This assumption is false, as will be discussed later. However, it is helpful in terms of deriving clear and
simple expectations in the following.
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aﬀecting a group's well being.
ui = vi(α) + z(γi, ) (3.7)
Then for simplicity let us assume three possible economic statuses, γ, of a group: they
are either privileged (γhigh), have median GDP per capita (γaverage) or they are deprived
(γlow). This is their net economic position, regardless of political system. I further assume
there are three types ζ of groups ∈ G. ζL, which is a relatively large group demographically,
and ζS, a small group, and ζM , which is a medium sized group. Following from equations
(3.3), (3.4) and (3.7), we can derive which systems are better for groups with various sizes
and economic statuses. For instance:
uL(θmaj, ζL, γhigh) > uL(θPR, ζL, γhigh) (3.8)
uS(θmaj, ζS, γhigh) < uS(θPR, ζS, γhigh) (3.9)
uS(θmaj, ζS, γhigh) > uS(θmaj, ζS, γlow) (3.10)
The optimal position of a group I denote u∗. Under what conditions then, is it rational
for an ethnic group to engage in violent conﬂict against the state to achieve or approach u∗?
The expected gain from a rebellion is aﬀected not only by a negative discrepancy between
u∗ and u, but also by the chances of success, and the costs of war. I let pi denote the un-
certainty regarding succeeding with the rebellion and actually improving the status quo, c
denotes a cost from loosing a rebellion and κ the ﬁxed cost assigned to organizing a rebel-
lion3. As Fearon (1995) argues, wars are committed despite high costs due to commitment-
and information-problems4, and I assume that wars will be fought despite their costs and
uncertainty, as long as the distance between value capabilities and value expectations is
suﬃciently high, and the expected costs are such that:
piu∗ + (1− pi)(usq − c)− κ+ > usq. (3.11)
This implies that the probability of conﬂict onset decreases where the sum of the expected
3These parameters and Equation (3.11) are largely similar to Reynal-Querol (equation 5 in 2001:9-10)
4Both groups have incentives to misrepresent their own power ability, and they have have diﬃculties
credibly committing to some peaceful alternative to war. See also Wucherpfennig (2009) for a good discussion
of information-problems in intrastate war.
3.1. A THEORETICAL MODEL 29
gain and the costs of armed conﬂict exceeds the value of the status quo.
In order to reach to these expectations regarding the conditional eﬀects of election sys-
tems, I have made some simplifying assumptions:
Assumption 1 Each group's share of the electorate is closely reﬂected in the number of
votes going to each political party.
Assumption 2 All ethnic actors are aware of the costs of ﬁghting.
What do we learn from equation 3.11? For one; small groups under majoritarian systems
are the least privileged, all else equal, and should be more prone to rebel. They have little
inﬂuence over politics under majoritarian systems. In a majoritarian system, the probability




, will rebel is higher than it is under a proportional
system, all other things equal. The distance between the preferred policy (α∗i ) and the status
quo policy (αsqi ) is likely to be greater than in proportional systems, due to the tendency for
majoritarian systems to produce policies preferred by the median voters α∗m which beneﬁt
the group in demographic power (see equations (3.3) and (3.4)). This situation is one where
(as I discussed in section 2.1.4) the state does not present an institutional-conﬁgurational
setup that serves the interests of most ethnic groups. We can expect the politically excluded
group to view their membership in the state as less binding and even threatening for their
political and economic future.
Second; Equation 3.11 tells us that all else is not equal  pi is likely to be low for small
groups since they have a smaller demographic base from which to mobilize rebels, and they
may choose a bad status quo over an even worse post-conﬂict status after loosing a war.
When power sharing institutions are present, the incentives for small groups to contain
conﬂict within the political sphere will be even greater; knowing that warfare will be costly
and perhaps counterproductive to the goal of a betterment of the group's economical position
and well-being, the group will choose sustained political conﬂict over violence.
Median sized groups will also prefer proportionality over majoritarianism, since they
cannot be certain to get their representatives elected. They also have a larger probability
of success in war, and we can therefore expect such groups to rebel more often than smaller
groups. The larger groups will according to bargaining theory be able to receive concessions
from the state without turning to violence, since the state fears engaging in armed conﬂict
with them (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011; Walter 2006). Therefore we can expect the increasing
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risk of onset that follows from relatively larger group sizes to decline at the highest range of
relative sizes.
According to the relevant theories I presented, proportional election systems will, all else
equal, dampen the frustration of economically deprived ethnic groups within the state: As
I discussed earlier (section 2.2), one consequence of persistent economic HIs is frustration,
which in turn can produce violent behaviour. If, however, a deprived group has de jure access
to power, or potential access to power, they will not perceive of the economic inequality as
an inﬁnite condition; When the state is not fully captured by one or more ethnic groups, all
groups within the state have the opportunity to take part in shaping the future of the state,
and hence their own economic and political future. When a proportional election system
is in eﬀect, the relatively greater potential for inclusion that such a system oﬀers, reduces
frustrations.
When institutionalized political HIs, in the form of a majoritarian election system, and
economic HIs are both present, the risk of civil war is, all else equal, larger than when
only one of the inequalities is present. The more accommodated a poor group is, the less
prominent are the negative eﬀects of being economically deprived. Reversely, economically
privileged groups that are discontent with the institutional setup, have less to gain from
rebellion than poor and discontented groups. This has been shown empirically to be the
case; Cederman et al. (2011:488-489) ﬁnd that the conﬂict potential for relatively poorer
groups is larger than that of richer groups.
On the other hand, Cederman et al. (2011:488-489) also ﬁnd that both privileged and
deprived groups experience higher risk of civil war than those at country average. Why do
rich groups rebel? Following the reasoning here, rich groups will only rebel if the value of
θ is low for them, that is, if the institutional setup does not proﬁt them or if the group
fears loosing wealth under the current system. We can therefore expect diﬀerent incentives
for groups above and below the country average. The relatively poorer, the greater the
frustration. We see in equation (3.11) that people will only rebel if they ﬁnd the expected
gain of rebellion to outweigh the expected loss. Being a little less wealthy than other groups
will not be as conducive to intrastate peace as greater levels of inequality. Only when the
sum of HIs is considerable is it rational for an ethnic group to rebel.
Since the tendency for one party to gain the majority of seats in the legislature is weakened
in PR systems, the solution is often power-sharing between political parties in the executive.
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Electing members of parliament proportionally enhances minority representation, and allows
greater segments of society to voice their preferences.
3.2 Hypotheses
To sum up the theoretical expectations, I divide them into four hypotheses. Since the
theoretical model above articulate a conditional eﬀect of proportionality my expectations
are conditioned on the compositions and the economies of groups. The hypotheses consider
these features both separately and combined, while the overall and general proposition is:
The negative eﬀect of proportional electoral systems on the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict
is not uniform across diﬀerently composed states and ethnic groups. Rather, the eﬀect is
conditional on salient ethnic cleavages.
This general proposition implies, in line with my theoretical model, four speciﬁc hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 An increase in relative group size is associated with an increase in probability
of intrastate armed conﬂict onset, with a reducing rate for very large sizes, but under PR
systems the risk of conﬂict only increases for very large sizes.
This can be written as a regression function, where β denotes the coeﬃcients:
P (Y = 1) = f(βIntercept + βθθ ∗ βζζ + βγγ + βpipi + ). (3.12)
Exchanging the parameters for variables, and including X to denote the set of control
variables capturing the strength of parties and probability of success, the regression function
becomes
P (Y = 1) =f(β0 + β1PR + β2Size+ β3size
2 + β4(Size× PR) + β5(Size2 × PR) (3.13)
+ βX + ).
Simplifying this equation, the conditional eﬀect of PR can be rewritten to the function
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β1 + (β2 + β4)Size+ (β3 + β5)Size
2 + βX + ), (3.14)
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where a PR systems is in place, whereas in a non-proportional system, the equation simpliﬁes
to:
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β2Size+ β3Size
2 + βX + ). (3.15)
If hypothesis 1 is correct, we should see a negative β3 and a positive β5, meaning that the
conditional eﬀect of PR systems and size is increasingly negative with larger ethnic groups,
and not linear.
Another way of assessing the eﬀect demographic power is to consider the overall level
of polarization in a country. Polarization as a determinant of civil war is supported in the
literature (for example Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). For instance, polarization is
high where two ethnic groups are of similar size, ζA ≈ ζB. If they live under a majoritar-
ian systems, they might alternate over political power from election to election, or one of
the groups may be able to secure legislative power repeatedly, making the ethnic diﬀerence
salient. This is a combination of group features and an institutional setup where my model
predicts an increased risk of intrastate armed conﬂict (assuming the constant cost κ and
c are negligible). The opportunity cost of rebellion if these groups operated under a PR
system, would be higher, and therefore I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 An increased risk of rebellion associated with higher ethnic polarization is
less prominent under PR than under other election systems.
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β1PR + β2Polarization+ β3(PR× Polarization) + βX + ) (3.16)
When PR = 1, the equation is
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β1 + (β2 + β3)Polarization+ βX + ), (3.17)
an when PR = 0 equation 3.16 simpliﬁes to
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β2Polarization+ βX + ), (3.18)
Inequality will also exacerbate ethnic cleavages and increase the risk of conﬂict. PR
systems are conceived to result in political inclusion and broader economic programs and
redistribution, therefore:
3.2. HYPOTHESES 33
Hypothesis 3 An increase in economic inequality is associated with an increased risk of
rebellion, but this increase in risk has a less steep slope in PR systems.
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β1PR + β2Inequality + β3(PR× Inequality) + βX + ) (3.19)
When P = 1 and P = 0, the respective equations become
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β1 + (β2 + β3)Inequality + βX + ) (3.20)
P (Y = 1) = f(β0 + β2Inequality + βX + ). (3.21)
Finally, the combined presence of larger groups and economic deprivation is the most
explosive mixture. Small groups under majoritarian systems with γlow are the least privileged
of all groups. But as we saw above, they are less likely to rebel than larger groups due to
their smaller chances of success. Also, larger groups dissatisﬁed with the institutional setup
might choose not to go to war, if they are in a privileged economic position.
Hypothesis 4 The risk of intrastate armed conﬂict increases with higher relative size and
negative economic inequality, and the combination of larger sizes and high levels of depriva-
tion is the greatest treat to ethnic peace. However, under PR systems, there is no increase
in risk with increases in inequality or size.
P (Y = 1) =f(β0 + β1PR + β2Size+ β3Size
2 + β4Inequality + β5(PR× Size) (3.22)
+ β6(PR× Size2) + β7(PR× Inequality) + β8(Size× Inequality)
+ β9(Size
2 × Inequality) + β10(PR× Inequality × Size)
+ β11(PR× Inequality × Size2)
+ βX + )
34 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS
When P = 0, the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict is the simpliﬁed function:
P (Y = 1) =f(β0 + β2Size+ β3Size
2 + β4Inequality + β8(Size× Inequality) (3.23)
+ β9(Size
2 × Inequality)
+ βX + )
Chapter 4
Empirical strategy
I will test my theoretical model by the use of regression analysis. Approaching my research
question statistically, is neither easy nor unproblematic; There are few onsets of intrastate
armed conﬂict, many causes in consideration and little institutional variation over time
within states. Still, the often universal claims regarding the peace-preserving eﬀects of PR
systems, deserve to be assessed quantitatively.
The remainder of this chapter concerns valid and reliable operationalization and statisti-
cal methods. I will provide the reader with the main bivariate and multivariate relationships
in the data, as a primer for the estimated results presented in the next chapter. Econometric
concerns will be addressed alongside the presentation of the data. I devote a section to
addressing missingness in the dataset, before discussing the choice of statistical model  the
rare event logit. Lastly, I discuss the main statistical challenges.
Keeping the parameters and expectations from chapter 3 in mind, I ﬁrst turn to the units
of observation, and the operationalization of dependent, independent and control variables.
4.1 Units of observation
My hypotheses concern both politically relevant ethnic groups and the states in which they
live throughout the world. I therefore need to consider both groups and states as the unit
of analysis.
Data on relevant ethnic groups and their states are derived from the Ethnic Power Re-
lations dataset (EPR) (Cederman et al. 2009), and from replication data for Cederman
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et al.'s (2011) article. The EPR data identiﬁes all politically relevant groups and measures
how access to state power diﬀers among them. The EPR dataset might be considered an im-
provement over previous datasets on access to power, due to the coding of ethnically relevant
groups.
I have access to data on a yearly basis and the units of observation are group-years. The
use of this panel data allows me to deal with unobserved heterogeneity in the units, and
potential time trends aﬀecting all units. It also gives more variability in the data alleviating
multicollinearity problems and providing more eﬃcient estimation (Kennedy 2008:281-282).
I will study the temporal range from 1972 to 2005. Committing analysis on this time-frame
enables me to include many onsets of intrastate armed conﬂict, and allow for variation over
time. The time period is also one in which most colonial empires were dissolved, and within
which we can expect election systems to function approximately the same across time.
In the dataframes I have developed there are data from 95 diﬀerent countries, 284 relevant
ethnic groups, measured over 34 years. All groups are not coded all years, and I exclude
groups smaller than 500.000 members, since the coding for these groups is less reliable
(Nordhaus et al. 2006). This makes for a total of 6632 observations of group-years.
4.2 Operationalization
The goal of the operationalization is to capture the theoretical concept into valid indicators,
so that my results reﬂect in a meaningful manner the theoretical framework and the deﬁned
concepts in my models (Adcock and Collier 2001). I will ﬁrst account for the operational-
ization of the dependent variable, armed conﬂict onset, before moving on to measures for
institutions, economic inequality and the group and state features hypothesized to inﬂuence
propensity to warfare. I will lastly present control variables on both the country and group
level
4.2.1 Dependent variable: onset of intrastate armed conﬂict
I ask what eﬀect various factors have on the probability of the onset of intrastate armed
ethnic conﬂict. Hence the dependent variable is binary - either there was the onset of
internal armed conﬂict or there was not; More speciﬁcally I use a variable coded 1 for an
ethnic group that has links to a rebel organization that was actively involved in ﬁghting;
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that is if a rebel organization expresses its political aims (at least partly) in the name of the
group and a signiﬁcant number of members of the group were participating in the conﬂict
(Cederman et al. 2011:484).
Data on conﬂict onsets is derived from the Cederman et al. replication data and from
EPR. These sources base their coding on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂicts Data Set (ACD)1
(Gleditsch et al. 2002). ACD deﬁnes armed conﬂict as any armed and organized con-
frontation between government troops and rebel organizations or between army factions
that reaches an annual battle death threshold of twenty-ﬁve2 (Cederman et al. 2010), and
an observation is coded 1 the year the conﬂict began, and 0 for subsequent years of conﬂict.
Though I determine the threshold for an armed conﬂict in terms of battle-deaths, this
must not be confused by an assessment of the impact or consequences of a civil war, which
can be disastrous, both during and after the conﬂict. For example, the war in Angola (1975-
2002) caused around 1.5 million war deaths, and only about 11% of these were battle-related
(Weidmann 2009:1).
In my dataframe covering the years 1972 through 2005, there are 77 armed conﬂict onsets.
In the speciﬁcation where non-democracies are excluded the corresponding number is 18.
Though we observe onset or not in absolute terms, there is reason to expect that all
outcomes are not associated with similar certainty; In one case there might be great will-
ingness to ﬁght, and perhaps even some small-scale violence resulting in a few deaths, but
not enough so to deﬁne the event as an internal conﬂict onset. In other cases there is no
incentive or attempts to organize a rebellion at all. Still these two cases are observed as
being in the same state. I therefore ﬁnd it more appropriate to understand onset of civil
war as a latent variable, where an underlying propensity for armed conﬂict onset Y ∗ is what
generates the observed outcome Y (Long 1997:40-41) (See also section 4.5.)
4.2.2 Operationalizing election systems
As indicator for the parameter θ, election system, I use the election system variable from
the Institutions and Elections Project (IAEP) dataset (Regan and Clark 2007; Regan et al.
1The link between the organizations and the EPR groups is provided by NSA2EPR, a conﬂict resource that
identiﬁes organizations ﬁghting for, and recruiting from, particular EPR groups (Cederman et al. 2011:484).
2Other violent encounters, such as massacres, genocides, communal riots and pogroms are excluded, either
because both parties are not organized, or because the government is not involved.
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2009a). The IAEP data3 is comprehensive and oﬀers detailed information on the rules states
have constructed for governance.
In the IAEP data the system of a country in a given year is recorded as being one
of the four categories Plurality (also called First past the post), Majority, Proportional
Representation andMixed System. As indicator of PR systems I collapse strictly proportional
systems and mixed systems of election. As indicators for majoritarian systems I observe
whether the system is majoritarian or pluralist, since these types will be subject to the same
conﬂict mechanisms, as discussed in section 1.1.3.
There is a general tendency for fewer states to use a plurality system; In 1972, 32% of
the countries where legislatures were elected used a plurality system and 25% a proportional
system. By 2005, only 15% of countries used a plurality system and 35% determined winners
based on proportional representation (Regan et al. 2009b:291).
Banned parties capture another dimension of party dynamics as discussed in section 2.3.1.
When political parties cross-cut ethnic lines, we will see less violence and civil war. Cross-
cuttingness of parties may be visible where ethnic and religious parties are banned, but at
the same time such banning of parties can be interpreted in terms of policies aiming exactly
at excluding some groups in society from power. I will discuss this further in chapter 6. The
variable for banned parties is a dummy, and is obtained from the IAEP dataset.
Occurences N
Proportional election system 2010 6632
Proportional systems excluding the mixed systems 948 6632
Democracy 2321 6632
Banned parties 3396 6632
Onset of intrastate armed conﬂict 77 6632
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics on categorical variables after imputation. Temporal range
1972-2005. Monopoly and dominant groups excluded.
3The IAEP presents two distinct dataset. However as I do not employ the second one (on the population


















Figure 4.1: Pie chart of election systems
The red pie charts shows distribution over election systems by number of observations. The
blue pie shows distribution of election systems by country for a random year (1995).
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4.2.3 Economic inequalities
There is a distinction between the economic inequalities internally perceived by an ethnic
group, and the externally observable ones. While the former are the ones that motivate
groups to rebel, the latter are measurable, and hence in operationalizing economic horizon-
tal inequalities I rely on estimates based on observations of economic performance. These
estimates are derived from Cederman et al.'s (2011) replication data, and are constructed on
the basis of the GeoEPR data, which is a geographically coded version of the EPR groups,
giving spatial estimates of economic performance for politically relevant ethnic groups (Ce-
derman et al. 2011:484).
I use two types of measures4 to capture γ, economic inequality, from the theoretical
model: 1) A symmetric logged form, and 2) an asymmetric, non-logged form. The former I
name Inequality (sq. log), and it is calculated in the following manner:
Inequality(sq.log) = [log(w/W )]2, (4.1)
where w denotes the GDP per capita of the ethnic group, and W denotes the average GDP
per capita of all the groups in the country. This measure captures both positive and negative
deviation from country average, and groups close to average GDP per capita will have a value
close to 0 on this variable. I follow Cederman et al. (2011) in refraining from including the
unsquared measure for inequality, since it`s eﬀect cannot be separated from zero. I theorized
that being a little less wealthy than other groups will not be as conducive to intrastate war
as greater levels of inequality. Only when the sum of HIs is considerable it is rational for an
ethnic group to rebel, and therefore the squared measure is a more valid operationalization
of inequality.
For the asymmetric measures, which I name Negative inequality and Positive inequality
the equations are:
4See for instance Stewart (2008:chapter 5), for a discussion on general principles of measurement of
economic inequalities.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of deprivation
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Negative inequality = W/w if w < W, 0 otherwise (4.2)
Positive inequality = w/W if w > W, 0 otherwise (4.3)
The negative inequality measure will have positive values if a group is poorer than the
average group, and the positive inequality value will be positive if the group is wealthier.
For example a group that is three times poorer than the country average will be coded as
Negative Inequality = 3.
GeoEPR are based on Nordhaus et al. (2006) who assemble the best available data
on local economic activity within countries for geographical grid cells (1◦), and convert
these to comparable ﬁgures into purchasing power parity (PPP), based on regional gross
product data, estimates of regional income by industry, estimates of rural population and
agricultural income5. The temporal scope of the inequality data is limited to one year  1990
(Wucherpfennig et al. 2011).
Figure 4.2 shows that the frequency of high level deprivation is greater in majoritarian
than proportional systems. In general, the data for high-income countries are the most
reliable, while those for low-income countries are the least reliable (Nordhaus et al. 2006:10).
Though PR systems are considered to diminish inequality in the long run (Knutsen 2011;
Persson and Tabellini 2003:22-30), I follow Cederman et al. (2011:484) in assuming economic
inequality quite persistent over time6. Key features sustaining group economic inequality
include dependence of the returns of one type of capital on the availability of other types,
asymmetries in social capital and present and past discrimination by individuals and non-
governmental institutions, as well as discrimination by governments (Stewart and Langer
2008:79).
4.2.4 The sizes and compositions of groups
According to my theoretical model relative size of groups, the ζ, is detrimental to the salience
of ethnic cleavages, and the strength of an ethnic group, aﬀecting the opportunity cost of
rebellion. I use four diﬀerent measures to capture diﬀerent aspects of the parameter: 1)
5see http://gecon.yale.edu/data-and-documentation-g-econ-project for country ﬁles and details.
6See section 5.4 for a methodological discussion
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Figure 4.3: The top plot depicts the bivariate relationship between relative sizes of groups
and the level of the economic inequality (the square of the log), the plot below shows the
relationship between logged GDP per capita and inequality.
The relative sizes of groups, 2) demographic power balance, 3) logged size and 4) ethnic
polarization. For the ﬁrst three of these, the natural log of the variables are also used.
Relative size is a proxy for how large the ethnic group in question is relative to the
total population. In order to operationalize this variable, the population estimate for each
ethnically relevant group is divided by the sum of the population for each country. I derived
the values from measure from the EPR dataset (Cederman et al. 2009). Realtive size2 is
the square of this measure. The top plot in Figure 4.3 shows the bivariate distribution of
symmetric inequality and relative size.
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Log of relative size is a variable obtained from the EPR dataset measuring ln(Group−pop
Total−pop ).
The logged measure for relative group size allows for more variation in the eﬀect between
the smaller groups.
I include a measure for demographic balance between groups also named b from Cederman
et al.'s (2011) data. Denoting the size of an ethnic group s and the size of the ethnic group(s)
in central power (EGIP) S, the balance is:
b = s/S if GE, (4.4)
b = s/(s+ S) if GI, (4.5)
Where GE is a group excluded from power, and GI is an included group. In this manner,
groups with b >0,5 are larger than the EGIP, and smaller groups have 0<b<0,5.
Dem. power(sq.) is the the square of the demographic power balance, and is employed in
due to my expectation that the results will be in line with bargaining theory, such that groups
with very high or low power compared to the EGIP will not resort to violence. Employing
both measures allows for two diﬀerent coeﬃcient estimates, and hence allow for a non-linear
eﬀect of demographic power balance.
Polarization is measured by use of Reynal-Querol's (2005) polarization measure after









where ζi is the proportion of individuals who belong to group i and there are G groups. This
measure assumes that the distance between all groups is one. The EP runs from 0, which
means no polarization, up to 1 for maximum polarization7. The measure used in the analysis
is from EPR.




Democracy is another key explanatory variable in my models, important in two respects.
First, democracies are often perceived as more peaceful than other regime types, and theory
on the democratic civil peace has long inﬂuenced empirical investigation of civil war. How-
ever, there is convergence towards a consensus in the quantitative literature that democracy
in itself does not reduce the risk of civil war onset (Hegre and Nygard 2012:5)8.
Second, the eﬀect and the content of political institutions diﬀer across regime types,
and it is the eﬀect of primarily democratic institutions that are addressed in my theoretical
framework. However, institutions are present and important in some autocratic regimes as
well. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), for instance, claim that authoritarian rulers rely on
nominally democratic institutions to neutralize threats from larger groups within society
and to solicit the cooperation of outsiders, but there is nevertheless little reason to believe
that autocratic election systems share the theorized eﬀects of election systems in democratic
states, and I therefore run models on two diﬀerent datasets: One excluding non-democracies,
and the other inducing all regime types. Due to restrictions in the data, and especially the
low number of onsets in democracies, I settle with simply controlling for democracy in most
models. (See sections 5.4 and 6.2 for discussions.)
I employ a procedural measure for democracy derived from Cheibub et al. (2010). This
proxy is based on the deﬁnition that democracies are regimes in which governmental oﬃces
are ﬁlled as a consequence of contested elections (Cheibub et al. 2010:69). The deﬁnition
highlights that for a regime to be democratic both the chief executive oﬃce and the legislative
body must be ﬁlled by elections, and contestation occurs when there exists an opposition
that has some chance of winning oﬃce as a consequence of elections (Cheibub et al. 2010:69).
Employing this trivial measure ensures that not too many states in the data are considered
non-democracies, securing heterogeneity in the observations of onsets in democracies, for
those models where I exclude non-democracies.
8See also Hegre et al. (2001); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeer (2004).
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The strength of the state
The factor best capturing the parameter pi (the probability of success in armed conﬂict) in
the theoretical model of intrastate war (see page 28), is the strength of the state9.
Most civil wars occur in less developed countries (Collier et al. 2003), and development
may interfere with inequalities and institutions. Therefore GDP per capita is one important
proxy for state strength. I expect development to mitigate the intensity of the will to control
government; If possibilities for prosperity exist apart from control over government resources,
the government is not the sole objective of all groups and individuals (Spears 2000:115).
For instance, Bermeo (2002) runs a regression separating states on the grounds of level of
wealth. She ﬁnds that there are diﬀerent eﬀects of political institutions across the range of
economic development.
My measure for GDP per capita is logged, since the eﬀect of development level on risk
of conﬂict is likely to be non-linear. There is reason to expect that the eﬀect increases more
rapidly with changes in GDP at the low range than for higher levels of development.
Another proxy for state strength is the Logged Population size. Other things equal, central
governments in larger societies will ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to satisfy divergent preferences over
redistribution and public goods (Garrett and Rodden 2003; Alesina and Spolaore 1997:1029).
The number of Excluded groups will aﬀect a governments resolve towards ethnic conces-
sions. Walter (2006) argues that governments facing a large number of ethnic groups will
be less willing to make concessions, in fear of domino eﬀects. A large number of excluded
groups leads to lower probability of civil war since groups living in such countries will face a
harder time receiving grants from the government. I use measures of the number of excluded
groups within a country from the Cederman et al. (2011) replication data.
Controlling for time dependencies
Peace years is the number of years a group has lived in peace. These are included to model
temporal dependence. I expect a positive eﬀect of previous wars to decline over time, but
I have no theoretical expectation as to the form of this decline. Taking time seriously can
be achieved in this instance through the use of splines or polynomial of time (Beck et al.
1998). The data-generating process is temporally dependent, and the use of a rare events
9Strictly speaking, the stronger the state, the lower the pi, so that increases in the variables capturing
state strength are operationalizations of (1− pi).
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model with only a linear speciﬁcation of peace years would be inappropriate since it implies
a constant hazard (Carter and Signorino 2010:274).
Carter and Signorino (2010) discourage the use of time dummies and splines, and recom-
mend the use of cubic polynomials as an approach to account for time dependence in binary
data. I therefore include a variable for Peace years, along with its squared and cubed values
(peaceyears2 and peaceyears3). Though splines are not necessarily problematic, they are
often not fully understood by political scientists, which potentially can lead to biases as
serious as biased hazard(Carter and Signorino 2010:14). Carter and Signorino show using
Monte Carlo experiments and replication analyses that cubic polynomials perform just as
well as splines.
Time trends in intrastate armed conﬂict onsets are controlled for by including a proxy
for calendar year. We live in an increasingly more peaceful world, due to factors such as
increasing interstate cooperation and political and economic development (Gurr 2000), and
one might argue that an expansion of the understanding of humanity produces more benign
foreign policies and international aﬀairs (Finnemore 2003), and also aﬀects a decrease in the
level of intrastate violence between groups.
mean st.d min max N
Inequality (square of log) 0.125 0.372 -0.172 3.238 6632
Negative inequality 0.796 0.864 -0.175 6.046 6632
Positive inequaltiy 0.514 0.621 0.000 3.344 6632
Demographic power balance 0.255 0.268 0.001 1.000 6632
Power balance (squared) 0.136 0.231 0.000 1.000 6632
Relative size 0.186 0.222 0.000 0.980 6632
Log of realitve size 2.121 1.621 -3.159 4.605 6632
Polarization 0.671 0.159 0.078 0.988 6632
GDP per cap (log) 8.054 1.036 5.231 11.076 6632
Excluded groups 7.984 14.619 0.000 55.000 6632
Log of population size 14.977 1.371 13.141 20.308 6632
Year 1989.478 9.882 1972.000 2005.000 6632
Peace years 29.582 15.645 0.000 59.000 6632
Disproportionality 8.854 4.196 0.018 34.520 6632
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics on numeric variables after imputation. Temporal range
1972-2005. Monopoly and dominant groups excluded.
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4.3 Missing values and imputation
In my data there is some missingness, which could lead to bias if not addressed. I assume that
observations are missing at random (MAR)10, meaning that the missingness only depends
on the observed part of the data-set and the parameter. In other words, the values of the
variables that are missing depend on the values of the other variables in the dataset (Høyland
and Nygård 2012:9). This assumption allows for the use of multiple imputation.
There is no deﬁnite way to test whether the assumption of MAR is true, so there is
a possibility that some of these values are NMAR, and hence depend on some unrecorded
information, such as the value of some variable not included in the dataset, or on the variable
itself (Høyland and Nygård 2012:9), making imputations biased. It is not unthinkable that
for instance missing values on economic inequality depend on some particular traits within
the bureaucracy of states, not present in my data. Still, missing reports on economic factors
quite likely correlate with factors like a low GDP, and past and present conﬂicts, making the
assumption of MAR reasonable.
The multiple imputation procedure involves allowing the software Amelia II (Honaker
et al. 2011) taking one missing observation in my data and replacing it with ﬁve constructed
values, by use of all the information available in my dataset. In doing so Amelia construct
ﬁve datasets. In constructing the imputed data polynomials of time interacted with ethnic
groups, allowing the patterns over time to vary between the cross-sectional units. Allowing
for variation this way is reasonable since we can expect diﬀerent ethnic groups not to have
the same patterns over time in independent variables.
Figure A.1 in Appendix A depicts a comparison of the density of continuous variables in
the imputed data with the density of those in the original data. For economic inequality, for
instance, with 37 missing observations, the density changes somewhat after imputations, as
visible in Figure 4.4, but is similar across the ﬁve imputed datasets.
Since the variance of the imputed values is directly interpretable as the imputation un-
certainty, one can run analyses on all the imputed data-sets and then ﬁnd estimates with the
correct uncertainty by taking the average of them. An alternative recommended approach
is to combine the imputed datasets and analyse them as one (Little 2002:86). Since the
10Little (2002:12-13) distinguish between three types of missing data. Data missing completely at random
(MCAR), data missing at random (MAR) and data not missing at random (NMAR).
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Figure 4.4: Inequality (sq. log)'s distribution after imputation
Original data
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amount of missingness in my data is limited, and my estimates are almost exactly similar
across imputed datasets, I chose to present regressions run on only one of the datasets. This
approach does not alter results signiﬁcantly, and it is parsimonious.
4.4 Election systems and political outcomes
Theory of election systems stress how proportional election systems produce multi party
systems and make legislatures more proportional. This is also an important assumption
in my theoretical model and for the hypotheses. Do electoral systems aﬀect the degree of
proportionality in the legislature? Do we see less political exclusion in proportional systems
of elections? Figure 4.5 gives a clear picture of the empirical relationships in my data.
The top of Figure4.5 portrays the number of parties with more than 5% of the seats in
the legislature (IAEP data) under PR and majoritarian systems. We see that whereas within
majoritarian states one- party systems are the rule, we very seldom ﬁnd only one eﬀective
party under PR systems. Under PR systems a majority of legislatures consisted of more
than three parties.
The bottom plot shows the distribution of disproportionality among majoritarian and PR
systems.Disproportionality is a proxy for de facto proportionality in the legislature. I use
the Gallagher Index of electoral disproportionality, which uses the standard least squares
method for comparing the relationship between the parties' votes and their seats in the
legislature (Gallagher 1991; Carey and Reynolds 2011; Gandrud 2012). Higher numbers on
the Gallagher Index indicate that there is a greater disparity between votes and seats that
elections have produced more disproportional outcomes. This allows for insight to whether
election institutions work in the way assumed in my models, as Duverger's law prescribes.
The bivariate relationships depicted in the ﬁgure suggest that they do.
4.5 Statistical model: Rare events logit
Since my outcome variable is the probability of intrastate armed conﬂict onset, it is sub-
stantively reasonable that the eﬀect of independent variable will be non-linear, and have
diminishing returns as the predicted probability approaches 0 or 1 (Long 1997:39-40). The
use of a probit, logit or duration model could be considered. Trivially, these models return
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Figure 4.5: Election systems and legislatures. The ﬁgure shows number of parties in the
legislature (top) and disproportionality score(bottom), for majoritarian and proportional
election systems. Data: 1972-2005, all regime types.
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very similar results. Employing a logit on binary cross-section-time-series (BCSTS) data,
which is in one sense duration data, is justiﬁed since I model time dependency, as discussed
in section 4.2.5. Also Beck et al. (1998:1268) side with using the logit link because of its
greater familiarity, and it's ability to be extended in a way that meets the structure of my
data better.
Intrastate armed conﬂicts are rare events and I choose to use an extension of the logit
link that takes this rarity into account; The rare events logit model, as speciﬁed by King and
Zeng (2001a), is my main statistical tool. The case for this is that the maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) used in logistic models suﬀer from small-sample bias. No matter how
large the number of observations, there will be very few cases of onsets, leading to bias from
MLE (King and Zeng 2001a:145). Maximum-likelihood estimates are calculated by ﬁnding
the values of the intercept, the coeﬃcients and the variance that maximizes their likelihood,
given the values in the observed data.
The ML estimator is consistent, asymptotically eﬃcient and asymptotically normally
distributed (Long 1997:26-33), but the bias causes underestimation of event probabilities.
King and Zeng (2001a:146) show that for rare events data, P (Y = 1) is underestimated,
and hence P (Y = 0) is overestimated . The basic logic behind this is that the density of
zeros will have greater certainty than the density of ones, and hence pull estimates in one
direction: In order to make as few mistakes in prediction as possible, MLE will place the
outpoint for which values of an observed variable are associated with onsets closer to the
maximum of P (X|Y = 0) than to the minimum value of P (X|Y = 1), resulting in biased
coeﬃcient estimates assigned to the variable. These biases are in a predictable direction:
estimated event probabilities are too small (King and Zeng 2001b:704). In rare events data
these biases in probabilities can be substantively meaningful even with sample sizes in the
thousands (King and Zeng 2001a).
I use the Zelig package, and the relogit procedure in R (Imai et al. 2007; 2008) to estimate
the rare events model estimates using ML. The rare events procedure in R corrects the
estimates for this bias, by inserting additional weights into the ML-equation11.
In chapter 3 I presented the theoretically derived regression models as functions of the
variables(X) and their parameters (β). King and Zeng (2001a:140) show that the probabil-
ities in a rare events model can be calculated in the same manner as for a logistic model.
11See for example Imai et al. (2007:510) for the equation and the bias term.
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Inserting the logit link, the probability of armed conﬂict, becomes:





One problem that is only partly overcome through the use of the rare events logit is that
there is little variation in the outcome variable: only 77 of 6632 observations from 1972
to 2005 are coded as onsets of internal armed conﬂict. The eﬀect of the electoral system
must be estimated from cross-sectional variation in the data, since reform, and therefore
variation over time, is rare. As pointed out by Persson and Tabellini (2003:9), the non-
random selection on countries produces a risk that I confound any eﬀect of electoral system
with ﬁxed country characteristics. The problem is mitigated since the unit of observation is
ethnic groups, allowing for, at least some, within-country variation.
The threat of omitted variable bias is always present in statistical analysis (Stock and
Watson 2012:224). Since some unobserved factors may be correlated with my independent
variables and be determinants of ethnic conﬂict onset, I will employ alternative speciﬁcations
of the models, including additional controls. I will also run ﬁxed eﬀects models controlling
for country speciﬁc eﬀects. The intercept also picks up eﬀects from omitted variables.
Nonspherical errors are likely to occur. Error terms are almost always heteroskedastic,
and the error terms for each ethnic group will most likely be autocorrelated. I do not suspect
correlations of errors across units to be a great threat. To control for heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation I use Heteroskedasticity- and Autocorrelation-robust (HAC) standard errors
in regressions. More speciﬁcally I a kernel-based HAC covariance estimator employing the
weights given in Lumley and Heagerty (1999), clustering errors on countries.
The largest threat to making valid inference from the data is the problem of endogene-
ity. The origin of constitutional rules may be endogenous to the performance of institutions
(Persson and Tabellini 2003:104-105). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) theorized that the insti-
tutions of a country is a reﬂection of key cleavages within society, as more homogeneous
states tend to install majoritarian rules. In other words power sharing arrangements may
be endogenous to societal divisions. If a state was experiencing ethnic discrepancies or there
was fear that ethnic armed conﬂicts could occur at the time when the institutional design
was created, this could be crucial concerns guiding the decision to implement power sharing
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institutions. More speciﬁcally: If PR systems have a higher correlation with armed con-
ﬂicts than majoritarian systems it may be caused, not by the system, but by the historical
and cultural traits that made them self-select into proportionality (Persson and Tabellini
2003:114). Since estimation tools allowing for instrumentation in rare events models are not
available, I rely on the rare events procedure and the controls to provide statistical estimates.
I will also test robustness by the use of ﬁxed eﬀects models. These will help reveal whether
country-speciﬁc historical traits bias the logit estimates.
Towards the end of the next chapter, I address the concerns raised here. First, I will
present the results from the empirical analysis.
Chapter 5
Results
In this chapter I present the main results from the statistical analysis, according to the order
of hypotheses 1 to 4. I will only brieﬂy discuss the substantive result here, as I leave a
discussion of the implications for chapter 6. I present several regression model results for
each hypothesis. For the models estimated on equally many observations the AIC reports
very little variation in ﬁt1, and I therefore choose to include diﬀerent speciﬁcations, as they
are all suited for testing the empirical implications of my theoretical model.
I put emphasis on interpreting the strength and the statistical signiﬁcance of the inter-
action terms for the hypothesized relationships. In order to present marginal eﬀects I rely
on reporting ﬁrst diﬀerences from simulations and plotting the changes in expected values of
intrastate armed conﬂict onset for diﬀerent values of the parameters. My theoretical model
concerns what eﬀect PR systems have conditioned on salient ethnic cleavages, and not mainly
the probability of ethnic intrastate conﬂict.
For hypothesis 1 I present more alternative regression models in order to illustrate how
various model speciﬁcations and data aﬀect the coeﬃcient estimates. The models discussed
in some depth are reported in tables in the main text. Additional models are presented in
table format in Appendix B, or available in the do-ﬁle. In section 5.4 I address statistical
concerns regarding the models and discuss robustness and model ﬁt.
1Comparing the model's AIC we need to be certain they are derived from equally many observations
(Kennedy 2008:101).
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5.1 Varying eﬀects of PR systems across group sizes
The ﬁrst hypothesis concerned how relative group sizes aﬀects the eﬀect of PR systems.
To test the hypothesis I ﬁrst regressed the model on the original dataset, and then ran
several regressions on the imputed dataset. First I estimated a regression model consisting
of the variables most interesting theoretically, as operationalized in chapter 4, including the
control variables, and polynomials for peace year. I then proceeded with a speciﬁcation less
demanding to the data, using only one interaction term. Finally the same models are rerun
using the log of relative size, to see whether this speciﬁcation yields stronger estimates.
As visible from table 5.1 hypothesis 1 is supported, but the results vary across model
speciﬁcations.
The ﬁrst column (Model 1a) shows the results of the estimated regression model 1 on
the original data, using the measures for demographic power balance. Remember that we
had to observe a negative β for relative size, and a positive β for the square of group size, to
support the hypothesis. The size and the signs of the interaction coeﬃcients in this model
suggests that the empirical relationship may correspond to my model, but unfortunately the
standard errors are quite large, resulting in a p-value of 0.16, meaning that within normal
conceptions of statistical signiﬁcance, we cannot make any certain conclusions based on the
results. Could these disconﬁrming results be a product of missing data?
Model 1b tells us that this is not the case. We see that even for the imputed data, where
we have more observations, and the problem with missingness is curbed, the results are still
not statistically signiﬁcant. Rather the marginal conditional eﬀects are quite similar for the
ﬁrst two regressions. Still, we should not be fooled by the absence of stars. In ﬁgure 5.1
I compare the coeﬃcient estimates of Model 1a in table 5.1 to the coeﬃcients from the
model regressed on the imputed data. What this plot tells us is that though the estimates
cannot be said to be signiﬁcant within normal conceptions of statistical signiﬁcance, the
coeﬃcient estimates for the conditional eﬀect of PR and demographic power balance are
almost separable from zero, suggesting that we can be quite certain that the conditional
eﬀect of PR from relative size is negative.
Model 1c is an alternative speciﬁcation of model 1 where I use the relative size measure.
When including an interaction for the square of size, the model did not estimate properly,
and this speciﬁcation is therefore not reported. I then relaxed the assumption of a decreasing






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































58 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
Figure 5.1: Coeﬃcients plot from Model 1a and Model 1b. The dots mark the best
estimate, the thick lines show one standard deviation conﬁdence, and the thin line two
standard deviations.
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negative conditional eﬀect as group sizes grow large, in order to test if there might be some
linear conditional eﬀect of group size. The interaction term now turns signiﬁcant. In other
words: The risk of being involved in armed conﬂict does increase with relative group size
under non-PR systems. Under PR-systems, however, size has a negative eﬀect on the risk of
conﬂict onset, although this is a very imprecise estimate. The suggestion of a monotonically
decreasing eﬀect of relative sizes in PR systems is rather puzzling, considering the median
voter theorem, bargaining theory, and the theoretical model presented.
The fourth column in table 5.1 shows a third model speciﬁcation on the imputed data,
where demographic power balance is replaced by the log of relative group size, as described
in section 4.2.4. The coeﬃcients for the interaction terms are not consistent in terms of
direction with the other speciﬁcations of Model 1, but the estimates fail to reach signiﬁcance
even at the 20% level.
So far, I have not commented on the coeﬃcients of the other independent variables, as
these are of a secondary interest in this context. The control variables generally behave as
expected. The parameters for state coherence support the notion that small and strong states
are the most peaceful. Logged GDP per capita is consistently negative and signiﬁcant, and
inequality has a positive eﬀect. Democracy has the expected negative eﬀect on conﬂict onset,
though not a signiﬁcant one. Most notable of the independent variables is the coeﬃcient for
PR system, which is positive and signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations. However, this term must
be interpreted with caution, as it is the eﬀect of PR when a group is of zero size, which is of
course empirically impossible.
Another interesting estimate is that of banned parties  it seems that for groups living in
states where ethnic or religious parties are banned from electoral contest, the risk of conﬂict
increases. This result stands in contrast to majoritarian conceptions of ethnic parties, and
will be discussed in the next chapter.
My main interest lies in the marginal eﬀect of PR systems, depending on the size of the
group, which can be calculated2 as the partial change. For Model 1c, for instance, this is:
∂Onset
∂PR
= β1 + β4Size (5.1)
In order to show the marginal eﬀect, as a better interpretation of the conditional relation-
ship suggested by the coeﬃcients in table 5.1, I estimated expected values of the dependent
2I base this equation on Brambor et al. (2006:73) .
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variable, for various values on all independent variables, based on Model 1b and Model 1c.
I choose to investigate mainly the results from Model 1b over the more certain estimates
from column three, because this model is the one capturing the theoretical expectation more
adequately. And though the estimates are uncertain, the estimates can nevertheless give us
some idea regarding the conditional eﬀect of PR systems.
One illuminating way to present these results is in terms of the diﬀerences in eﬀect
on expected values between the presence and absence of a PR systems, holding all other
variables at their means3 as recommended by Long (1997); King et al. (2000).
To compute expected values and present them in the form of ﬁrst diﬀerences and plots of
marginal eﬀects, I used the Zelig package in R, which computes quantities of interest through
the use of simulation. Simulation is a simple way to compute features of the probability
distributions in my data (King 1997:141), so that I can report quantities of interest (such
as ﬁrst diﬀerences) and the uncertainty surrounding these values. This procedure allows for
better understanding of the statistical models presented in table 5.1. Since the vector of
β is uncertain, the changes in risk of armed conﬂict as we move from a majoritarian to a
proportional system, is also uncertain (King et al. 2000:349). Zelig picks 1000 random draws
from my data, and compute the Expected value of Y given speciﬁc values of all variables
in the model, E(Y |x).
Rather than setting all variables at their mean, a more informative approach is to set
variables at substantively interesting values4, and then investigate the change in onset prob-
ability between electoral system, dependent on the relative sizes of groups. As discussed
in chapter 4 (page 46), internal armed conﬂicts rarely happen in well developed countries,
and I therefore set the value for GDP per capita to both mean and the ﬁrst quantile of its
distribution. Keeping all other control variables at mean values, I calculated ﬁrst diﬀerences
based on Model 1b, as visible in table 5.2.
The ﬁrst diﬀerences indicate that for both relatively small and very large groups, the
marginal eﬀect of a PR systems is positive, while for those at the considerable sizes they
are negative. This supports my proposition of a non-linear conditional relationship. Also
3For all presentations of marginal eﬀects I set the character variables for democracy and banned parties
at 1. Using the means of these variables makes little sense substantially. This decision does not aﬀect the
presentation of marginal eﬀects by large.
4See King et al. (2000:356) for an argument supporting counterfactual estimates as a heuristic for under-
standing regression output.
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E(Y|PR) - E(Y|Majoritarian) b logged GDP per capita
0.003 Mean Mean
0.009 1st Q Mean
-0.002 3rd Q Mean
0.005 Mean 1st Q
0.016 1st Q 1st Q
-0.005 3rd Q 1st Q
0.022 Max 1st Q
Table 5.2: First diﬀerences Model1a
as relative sizes of groups increase the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict onset is larger under
majoritarian systems, but for the largest groups the risk is higher under proportionalism, in
line with my theoretical model. Still, the very small ﬁrst diﬀerences raise the question as
to how consequential the diﬀerences in risk of onset really is between majoritarianism and
proportionalism.
Perhaps the insigniﬁcance of the estimates diﬀer across the range of values for group
size? Figure 5.2 presents the plotted estimates of the eﬀect of demographic power balance as
speciﬁed in Model 1b for PR = 0 and PR = 1. GDP is set at 1st quantile, and all the other
variables at mean5. The plot shows the expected probabilities of intrastate armed conﬂict
onset.
The ﬁgure reveals that the marginal eﬀects of proportional elections run in the direc-
tions hypothesized in hypothesis 1, with the probability of conﬂict onset increasing under
majoritarian systems, but not so under PR. The clearly negative eﬀect for increases in de-
mographic power under PR systems, is more surprising, but still partly in line with my
theoretical model. The estimate has thinner conﬁdence bands around the lower range of
values, indicating that the certainty is greater at smaller sizes, but providing little leverage
in terms of giving conﬁdence in the estimates for larger sizes.
Since Figure 5.2 is based on the uncertain estimates from Model 1b, I included a ﬁgure
representing the alternative, and more certain Model 1c in Appendix B (page 114). Plotting
Model 1c shows the same tendency as ﬁgure 5.2.
5b2 could not be set to vary with b, so I tried a range of values, showing quite similar relationships. For
high b2-values, the probability of conﬂict grew suspiciously high, so I set b2 to the arbitrary and low value
0.1, possibly skewing the plot somewhat.
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Figure 5.2: Model 1. The eﬀect of demographic power balance, dependent on election
system
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Table 5.3: Hypothesis 2) The higher the ethnic polarization is within a country, the larger
is the risk of rebellion, but this increase is less prominent under PR than under other election
systems.
Model 2a Model 2b
Intercept 24.834 (32.565) 23.782 (31.358)
PR system 0.637 (1.300) 0.415 (1.227)
Ethnic Polarization 0.650 (1.051) 0.522 (1.041)
Economic inequality(sq. log) 1.462 (0.323)∗∗∗ 1.356 (0.317)∗∗∗
GDP per capita (logged) −0.716 (0.187)∗∗∗ −0.660 (0.176)∗∗∗
No. excluded groups −0.034 (0.017)∗ −0.030 (0.017)∗
Democracy −0.379 (0.341) −0.220 (0.322)
Banned ethnic parties 0.771 (0.298)∗∗∗ 0.725 (0.289)∗∗
Year −0.013 (0.016) −0.012 (0.015)
Peace years −0.265 (0.064)∗∗∗ −0.271 (0.062)∗∗∗
Peace years sq. 0.010 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.010 (0.003)∗∗∗
Peace years cubed 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗
Population (logged) 0.138 (0.111) 0.093 (0.110)
PR * Polarization −0.715 (1.750) −0.290 (1.660)
AIC 758.932 785.778
Log Likelihood -365.466 -378.889
Num. obs. 6535 6632
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Coeﬃcient estimates from rare events logit regression.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Data covering years 1972-2005. Groups > 500.000.
The imputed models are estimated on the ﬁfth of ﬁve imputed datasets.
5.1.1 Polarization and election systems
The results from Model 2 do not provide much leverage in terms of neither supporting nor
rejecting Hypothesis 2. The interaction term is negative as hypothesized, indicating that
polarization is less damaging to peace under PR systems than under majoritarian election
systems. However, the coeﬃcient never reaches signiﬁcance. This means there is no certain
conditional eﬀect of polarization. I refrain from interpreting these results any further here,
but will return to them when discussing an alternative speciﬁcation in the robustness section.
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5.2 Inequality challenges peace
Hypothesis 3 is partly supported. The coeﬃcient for the squared logarithm of economic
inequality is signiﬁcantly positive across speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcient for degree of negative
economic inequality is also positive and signiﬁcant, meaning that groups poorer than the
average wealth for groups in a country, are more at risk of experiencing armed intrastate
conﬂict, all else equal. The eﬀect of being economically privileged is characterized by uncer-
tainty.
Concerning the second and conditional part of the hypothesis, the results contradict my
model. We see that for both speciﬁcations in table 5.4, the interaction term for PR system
and economic inequality is signiﬁcant and positive, while for the hypothesis to be supported
we needed to see a negative β here. The interaction terms are quite precise and suggest that
inequality has an even greater impact on the risk of conﬂict under PR systems.
Again, I am interested in the marginal eﬀect of a proportional election system. In table 5.5
the ﬁrst diﬀerences estimated by simulation from counterfactual values are reported. Similar
to what I discovered in for Model 1, the ﬁrst diﬀerences are very small, suggesting that the
marginal eﬀect of election system is negligible. An interesting deviation here, is the diﬀerence
for the maximum value of negative inequality, which is very large.
I ﬁnd it unlikely that a change from a majoritarian to a proportional system could result
in such a dramatic change in the probability of intrastate armed conﬂict, even for very high
levels of inequality. Investigating the data more closely, I found that the result may be driven
by outliers6: The ﬁrst and second Chechen wars (1994 and 1999). The Chechen in Russia
have the highest score on negative inequality of all ethnic groups in the data, above 6. Below
them the next value of inequality is approximately 5 (the Karakalpaks in Russia), and there
are no additional onsets observed for any group with a negative inequality above 4. Besides
this Russia is the country with the highest score on the symmetric inequality measure of
all countries in the dataset (see table A.2, page 108). The Chechen in 1994 and 1999 were
the only group which experienced such strong economic deprivation, and lived within a PR
system. This suggests that any inference to other ethnic groups may be speculative.
I reran Model 3a excluding outliers. This resulted in more imprecise estimates, but the
6In general outliers are quite frequent in my data, but I refrain from excluding them to keep as much
variations between groups that experienced onsets as as possible. See Figure B.1 in Appendix B.
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Table 5.4: Hypothesis 3) An increase in economic inequality is associated with an increased
risk of rebellion, but this increase in risk has a less steep slope in PR systems.
Model 3a Model 3b
Intercept 22.454 (31.649) 25.425 (31.501)
PR system −0.614 (0.615) 0.055 (0.324)
Negative economic inequality 0.584 (0.295)∗∗
Positive economic inequality 0.590 (0.325)∗
Demographic power 1.215 (1.575) 0.962 (1.588)
Demographic power sq. −1.733 (1.885) −1.381 (1.914)
GDP per capita (logged) −0.660 (0.180)∗∗∗ −0.632 (0.177)∗∗∗
No. excluded groups −0.019 (0.017) −0.020 (0.018)
Democracy −0.164 (0.332) −0.173 (0.333)
Banned ethnic parties 0.784 (0.297)∗∗∗ 0.777 (0.296)∗∗∗
Year −0.011 (0.016) −0.013 (0.016)
Peace years −0.279 (0.063)∗∗∗ −0.280 (0.063)∗∗∗
Peace years sq. 0.011 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.011 (0.003)∗∗∗
Peace years cubed 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗
Population (logged) 0.088 (0.113) 0.085 (0.112)
PR * neg. inequality 0.520 (0.314)∗
PR * pos. inequality 0.739 (0.576)
Economic inequality sq. 0.902 (0.461)∗
PR * inequality sq. 0.740 (0.478)
AIC 787.013 784.017
Log Likelihood -376.506 -377.008
Num. obs. 6632 6632
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model 3. standard errors in parentheses.
Coeﬃcient estimates from rare events logit regression.
Data covering years 1972-2005. Groups > 500.000.
The imputed models are estimated on the ﬁfth of ﬁve imputed datasets.
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E(Y|PR) - E(Y|Majoritarian) Negative Inequality logged GDP per capita
-0.001 Mean Mean
-0.002 1st Q Mean
0.000 3rd Q Mean
-0.002 Mean 1st Q
-0.004 1st Q 1st Q
0.000 3rd Q 1st Q
0.456 Max 1st Q
Table 5.5: First diﬀerences Model3a
direction and strength of the interaction terms remained almost unchanged.
To get more leverage in interpreting the results, I will concentrate on more frequent values
of economic inequalities. Figure 5.3 shows the probability of conﬂict for PR and non-PR
systems over the range of values of negative inequality up to the 3rd quantile in the variable's
univariate distribution.
As visible, the marginal eﬀect of economic inequality varies little across election systems.
From the ﬁgure we get the impression that the eﬀect may be a little stronger under PR
systems than under majoritarian systems of election, with the probability of onset being
lower when inequality is zero, and then increasing more rapidly under PR election systems.
This result does not support the second part of hypothesis 3, stating that in PR systems,
economic deprivation is less of a destabilizing factor. Rather the results suggest that when
controlling for the conditional eﬀect of economic inequality, PR systems are more peaceful,
all else equal, but when economic inequality is high, PR systems are at least as vulnerable
to ethnic conﬂicts as majoritarian systems.
Plotting the density (Figure 5.4) of the ﬁrst diﬀerences from Model 3, reveal that it is
diﬃcult to distinguish between the two electoral systems, at all levels of negative economic
inequality. The plots here show the densities for low and high inequality, and though the
overlap is slightly less complete for low inequality, the plots show that the distributions
are not signiﬁcantly distinguishable at conventional levels of statistical signiﬁcance. It is
therefore safe to say that the result from Model 3 undermine the theoretical framework and
the models presented. The result will be examined further in the next chapter.
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Figure 5.4: Density plots of ﬁrst diﬀerences in Model 3












































Model 3a High Inequality







5.3 The combined marginal eﬀects
Hypothesis 4 stated that the there is a compound eﬀect of size, economic inequality and
PR system. In order to test the hypothesis, I included a triple interaction in the regression
model. The results from this procedure are visible in Table 5.6.
Coeﬃcients of triple interaction terms are very hard to interpret by and of themselves.
The table discloses that the regression performed on the imputed data (Model 4b) produces
more certain estimates than the model estimated on the original data. Model 4c, where I
replaced the demographic balance measures with Log of relative size, also reveals a signiﬁcant
interaction.
The coeﬃcient estimate for the interaction terms are very large in models 4a and 4b,
leading me to believe that these results are somewhat overdetermined. I tried simplifying
the models by reducing the number of controls, but this did not alleviate any potential bias,
as the coeﬃcients were consistent in size for smaller model frames7. These problems are
7By leaving out all non-signiﬁcant control variables and the polynomials of peace years from Model 4b,
the interaction estimates achieved higher signiﬁcance, but showed coeﬃcients as high as 17.
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Table 5.6: Hypothesis 4) The risk of intrastate armed conﬂict increases with higher relative
size and negative economic inequality, and the combination of larger sizes and high levels of
deprivation is the greatest treat to ethnic peace. However, under PR systems, there is no
increase in risk with increases in inequality or size.
Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c
Intercept 15.372 (32.601) 18.508 (31.740) 25.572 (31.786)
PR system 0.375 (0.733) 0.312 (0.710) −0.313 (1.103)
Demographic power −0.383 (2.800) 0.555 (2.694)
Negative economic inequality 0.057 (0.296) 0.039 (0.291) 0.164 (0.281)
Demographic power sq. 0.661 (3.692) −0.616 (3.469)
GDP per capita (logged) −0.661 (0.190)∗∗∗ −0.627 (0.178)∗∗∗ −0.630 (0.175)∗∗∗
No. excluded groups −0.002 (0.015) 0.001 (0.015) 0.005 (0.017)
Population (logged) 0.086 (0.115) 0.048 (0.113) 0.035 (0.117)
Banned ethnic parties 0.671 (0.309)∗∗ 0.600 (0.295)∗∗ 0.630 (0.295)∗∗
Democracy −0.221 (0.352) −0.085 (0.330) −0.067 (0.327)
Year −0.008 (0.016) −0.009 (0.016) −0.012 (0.016)
Peace years −0.275 (0.066)∗∗∗ −0.289 (0.063)∗∗∗ −0.287 (0.063)∗∗∗
Peace years sq. 0.011 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.011 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.011 (0.003)∗∗∗
Peace years cubed 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗ 0.000 (0.000)∗∗∗
PR * Dem. power −0.736 (8.032) 3.288 (7.185)
PR * Neg. inequality 0.600 (0.364)∗ 0.617 (0.357)∗ 0.553 (0.390)
Dem. power * Neg. inequality 1.443 (2.645) 1.144 (2.581)
PR * Dem. power(sq.) −7.067 (12.451) −12.753 (12.201)
Neg. inequality * Dem. power(sq.) −1.509 (3.777) −0.840 (3.679)
PR * Dem. power * Neg. ineq −5.946 (6.196) −8.170 (5.495)
PR * Dem. power(sq.) * Neg. ineq 12.689 (9.628) 15.853 (8.774)∗
Logged relative size 0.043 (0.283)
Logged realtive size(sq) 0.009 (0.072)
PR * Logged realtive size 1.776 (1.202)
Logged size * Neg. inequality −0.011 (0.168)
PR* Logged size(sq.) −0.643 (0.349)∗
Neg. inequality * Logged size(sq.) 0.011 (0.057)
PR * Logged size * Neg. ineq. −0.509 (0.406)
PR * Logged size(sq.) * Neg. inequality 0.198 (0.152)
AIC 765.595 791.158 791.616
Log Likelihood -361.798 -374.579 -374.808
Num. obs. 6535 6632 6632
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Model 4. Coeﬃcient estimates from rare events logit regression.
Data covering years 1972-2005. Groups > 500.000. Monopoly and dominant groups excluded.
The imputed models are estimated on the ﬁfth of ﬁve imputed datasets.
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discussed further in the robustness section. The more moderate estimate from Model 4c is
not signiﬁcant.
Choosing to put some conﬁdence in the estimates, though the coeﬃcients may be too
extreme, ﬁgure 5.5 gives a better idea as to what the result mean. Here, I have calculated the
marginal eﬀect economic deprivation for three levels of relative sizes of groups, conditioned
on election system. As a proxy for small groups I set the value of demographic power
balance to 0.15. For the medium groups this value is set to 0.3, and large groups are those
with demographic power at 0.68. The plots depict the simulation of expected values from
the estimates in Model 4b.
The left-hand plots show the combined conditional eﬀects of demographic power balance
and economic inequality for groups living under majoritarian systems (top) and PR systems
(bottom), for small groups. Ignoring the conﬁdence bands for now, we see that the hypoth-
esis is partly supported for small groups; As inequality increases under majoritarianism, so
does the probability of armed conﬂict, while under PR systems, the probability decreases.
Surprisingly, it seems that for very low levels of economic inequality, the risk of civil conﬂict
is higher in PR than in majoritarian systems.
The groups of medium size (middle plots) appear to behave similarly to the small groups,
and the best estimate suggests that the risk of conﬂict onset increases with inequality for
medium sized groups under majoritarian systems, perfectly in line with hypothesis 1d).
The plots for small and medium sized groups reveal, through their broad conﬁdence
bands, the great uncertainty of the estimates. For the last two plots, showing the marginal
eﬀects of inequality and election systems for large groups, the results seem rather extreme,
but again, there is large uncertainty attached to them. The tendency illuminated is nev-
ertheless in line with hypothesis 4  I expected that higher levels of inequality for large
groups under PR systems should yield a higher probability of intrastate war than the same
conﬁguration under a majoritarian system. Still, probabilities above 0.1 is extremely high
in the context of intrastate war, and I expect outliers to drive the results for larger groups.
I ﬁnd the estimates from Model 4 to rest on shaky ground methodologically, and I therefore
refrain from investigating these results any further.
8These values are theoretically interesting, according to my theoretical model where I hypothesize that
the medium sized groups will be more at risk of conﬂict onset under majoritarian than under PR systems.
However, the value of 0.15 which I name small group is actually the median observed value, and 0.6 is close
to the 99th percentile (0.67) of the univariate distribution of Demographic power balance.
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Figure 5.5: The combined marginal eﬀects of size and inequality
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5.4 Robustness and goodness of ﬁt
How well do the rare events models predict the outcome? The Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) is generally high in all my modes, with minor variations. Since the AIC is an estimate
of a constant plus the relative distance between the unknown true likelihood function of the
data and the ﬁtted likelihood function of my models, a lower AIC is better as this means the
models are closer to the truth (Kennedy 2008:101). However, since the rare events logit
is a choice of less bias over ﬁt (King and Zeng 2001a), the models reported here will have
lower log likelihoods than a normal logit, and we should not be worried by the high AIC (or
the low log-likelihood).
A simple and more illuminating answer to how well the models ﬁt is ﬁgure 5.6. This plot
shows how well the models predict. The X axis of the curve shows the share of all onsets
that are correctly classiﬁed, while the Y axis shows the share of correctly classiﬁed non-
onsets. Any point on the curved line indicates how the probability of correctly predicting a
1 is traded against the probability of correctly predicting a 0. We see that when sensitivity,
the probability of correctly predicting an onset, is very high, speciﬁcity, the probability of
correctly predicting a non-onset, declines.
Investigating the ﬁt of model 1, the areas under the curve (AUC) calculated using
Reimann sums (Weisstein 2012), were approximately 0.66 for Model 1b and 0.64 for 1c,
suggesting they both have good predictive power relative to a random guess, and that they
predict similarly well. For the remaining models the values are quite similar, with values
from approximately 0.62 (Model 3b) to 0.65 (Model 4b).
Omitted variable bias and endogeneity
The eﬀects reported so far may be products of omitted variable bias. There might be
hidden, and unobserved, country-ﬁxed or year-speciﬁc eﬀects9. Since I am interested in the
hypothesized relationships and not particularities of countries or year, I control for country
eﬀects by employing a ﬁxed eﬀects model. The approach here is to include dummy variables
for each cross-section (to create individual intercepts), and omit the intercept (Kennedy
2008:282-283). The results from this procedure is visible in table B.2 in Appendix B (page
9There might also be omitted group-speciﬁc eﬀects, but estimating a model with group-speciﬁc eﬀects
entails including 284 extra dummies, leaving very little variation.
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Figure 5.6: ROC curve
The ﬁgure shows Receiver Operator Characteristic plot. Solid line: First model in headline. Dashed line:
Second model in headline
74 CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
113). The key insight from the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation is that the coeﬃcients of interest are
quite similar both in strength, sign and certainty to those estimated using the rare events
logit10. The interaction term of demographic power balance and PR system in Model 1,
dips below the 90% conﬁdence level in the ﬁxed eﬀects model, suggesting that this result is
fragile, and that we cannot state with conﬁdence that there is any conditional eﬀect of PR
systems dependent on group sizes.
However, the ﬁxed eﬀect model may be too restrictive, for two reasons. First, the model
does not adjust for rare events, possibly leading to an underestimation of the probability
of intrastate armed conﬂict onset. The second qualiﬁcation is that though the ﬁxed eﬀects
model allows variation between groups within countries, it wipes out all explanatory vari-
ables that do not vary within a country (Kennedy 2008:284). This is especially harmful
in this context, since electoral institutions are very seldom reformed (Persson and Tabellini
2003:9), and within-country variation will be close to absent for this explanatory variable.
A less restrictive approach is to use a Random eﬀects model. This model assumes country
eﬀects to be normally distributed, and they are treated as belonging to the error term, pro-
ducing a composite error term consisting of both the country deviations and the traditional
random error (Kennedy 2008:284). Nor in a random eﬀects model is it possible to account for
rare events. I nevertheless ran random eﬀects regressions on all models, disclosing quite sim-
ilar coeﬃcients as the rare events logit model, but greater uncertainty. (See table B.3, page
113.) Taking the underestimation of onsets into consideration, the random eﬀects model to
some degree supports the main estimations from the rare events logits, suggesting that there
is little bias induced from omitted country speciﬁc factors.
My main concern regarding the robustness of the results is, as pointed out in chapter 4,
the theorized endogeneity of electoral systems and onset of intrastate armed conﬂict. There
might be an undiscovered and stronger conditional eﬀect of election systems, that could be
discovered if the models accounted for the origins of institutions. To see if the estimates
presented so far actually bear on this and are biased, an approach to consider is using an
instrumental variables approach appropriate for the binary and rare outcome under study11.
However, since there are very few onsets, and there exists, to my knowledge, no models
incorporating an instrumental rare events approach, these concerns must be left unstudied
10Model 4 could not be estimated, as it produced probabilities of zero and 1.
11One such approach might be using an instrumental probit, with the instruments described in Persson
and Tabellini (2003:129-130). See also Acemoglu (2005) for a discussion on the validity of these instruments.
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Table 5.7: Estimation on democracies
Model 1c Model 2b Model 3a
(Intercept) 97.034 (67.835) 101.366 (70.138) 96.043 (68.535)
PR.mixed 0.712 (0.852) 2.946 (2.564) 0.263 (1.906)
size 0.213 (3.203)
lineq2 0.271 (0.906) 0.479 (0.885)
lgdpcapl −0.555 (0.327)∗ −0.523 (0.309)∗ −0.535 (0.327)
exclgrps 0.334 (0.116)∗∗∗ 0.391 (0.119)∗∗∗ 0.419 (0.128)∗∗∗
banned 0.847 (0.566) 0.823 (0.560) 0.897 (0.579)
year −0.047 (0.033) −0.049 (0.035) −0.046 (0.034)
pyrs −0.262 (0.145)∗ −0.289 (0.149)∗ −0.275 (0.146)∗
pyrs2 0.010 (0.007) 0.011 (0.007) 0.010 (0.007)
pyrs3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)










AIC 200.905 201.843 201.784
Log Likelihood -87.452 -87.922 -84.892
Num. obs. 2321 2321 2321
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Coeﬃcient estimates from rare events logit regression.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Data covering years 1972-2005. Non-democracies excluded. Groups > 500.000.
The imputed models are estimated on the ﬁfth of ﬁve imputed datasets.
in this thesis.
Selection bias and multicollinearity
In section 4.2.5 I noted that the eﬀect and the content of political institutions diﬀer across
regime type. When I exclude non-democracies from the data, the returned estimates from
regressions change by much12. For models 1 and 3, as visible in table 5.7 the coeﬃcients
change signs or sizes, or their explanatory power is wiped out. However the results from
Model 2, investigating the eﬀect of polarization, are somewhat less uncertain than the results
12Regression Model 4 is not reported or discussed, due to the uncertainty of the previous estimate. I show
estimates for Model 1c on democracies, as Model 1b reported probabilities of zero and one.
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after regressing the Model on all regime types, with conﬁdence intervals not overlapping
zero. Figure 5.7 shows the results from simulations for this model, and reveal that though
the slope has a steeper increase in majoritarian systems for higher values of polarization, the
consequences of high ethnic polarization are quite similar between election systems.
Figure 5.7: Ambiguous eﬀect of polarization
























































The diﬀerences between regressing on the full dataframe and on democracies only might
suggest that the workings of election systems are diﬀerent between autocracies and democra-
cies. On the other hand, both the number of observations, and the number of onsets shrink
to a fraction when I exclude the non-democracies. With very few onsets (18) estimates are
likely to be biased due to little variation, despite the correction of the rare events procedure,
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and hence these results do not pose a great challenge to the robustness of my main ﬁndings13.
I suspect a violation of the assumption that the independent variables are not approx-
imately linearly related, resulting in too large variances of the relogit estimates (Kennedy
2008:192-198). I therefore ran tests for multicollinearity14. The square root of the Variance
Inﬂation Factor (VIF) showed that the standard errors are a little higher than they would
have been with no correlation between the independent variables. For the PR system variable
in Model 1b, for instance, the VIF is only 3.44, but for the interacted terms of demographic
power balance and it`s square variant, the VIFs are approximately 11.6 and 15.8, suggesting
that these estimates have standard deviations about 3 and 4 times higher than if these were
not correlated. This is not surprising since constitutive terms will be highly correlated with
the interactions. I ran the model using diﬀerent speciﬁcations both omitting and excluding
variables, and on diﬀerent temporal ranges, but the results where similar across speciﬁca-
tions15. The existing multicollinearity is a result of too little information in the data, and in
this sense any inﬂated standard errors are correct and reﬂect the inaccuracy of the estimates
in my models (Brambor et al. 2006:70).
5.5 Summary of empirical ﬁndings
Since the results from the rare events regression models are not all wiped out as a result of
frailty, they should be treated with some substantive interest. Before I move into a more
theoretically guided discussion, a summary of main ﬁndings is in order.
My main proposition was: The negative eﬀect of proportional electoral systems on the
risk of intrastate armed conﬂict is not uniform across diﬀerently composed states and ethnic
groups. Rather, the eﬀect is conditional on salient ethnic cleavages. This proposition is
partly supported by the rare events models, showing statistically signiﬁcant and substantial
13The temporal range of the data may also aﬀect results, both since there were more plurality systems
before the end of the cold war, and since more states are non-democracies the further back we go. To test
this I speciﬁed alternative models with temporal range from 1990-2005, but this resulted in some models
with probabilities of 1 and 0, due to too many constrictions on the data, or highly uncertain estimates,
probably as a result of the small N, and the small number of onsets. The conditional eﬀect of polarization
(Model 2) became signiﬁcant, but plotting the ﬁrst diﬀerences reveal a nearly complete overlap between PR
and non-PR systems. See do-ﬁle for details
14In order to do this I had to use a normal logit model, for which the estimates where slightly weaker but
similar to the rare event logit, as suspected since the logit underestimates the probability of Y = 1 when
events are rare.
15Tables of alternative models are available on request.
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conditional eﬀects, though with varying levels of certainty.
Hypothesis 1 proposed that: An increase in relative group size is associated with an
increase in probability of intrastate armed conﬂict onset, with a reducing rate for very large
sizes, but under PR systems the risk of conﬂict only increases for very large sizes. We saw
that the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict increased with larger group sizes under majoritarian
systems, supporting the ﬁrst part of the hypothesis. However, under PR systems, the results
suggest that the risk declines with larger group sizes, with a slower rate for very large sizes.
The wording of Hypothesis 2 was: An increased risk of rebellion associated with higher
ethnic polarization is less prominent under PR than under other election systems. The sign
of the coeﬃcient estimates supports this claim. But, since they are very far from signiﬁcance,
there is great uncertainty attached to these results, and they only undecidedly suggest that
higher polarization might be less of a danger under PR systems.
Hypothesis 3 was partly rejected. It stated that An increase in economic inequality is
associated with an increased risk of rebellion, but this increase in risk has a less steep slope in
PR systems. The rare events models suggest the opposite: Increasing levels of inequality is
a greater danger under proportional systems. For negative economic inequality, the contrary
evidence was statistically signiﬁcant. The ﬁrst part of the hypothesis, however, gained full
support: An increase in economic inequality is associated with an increased risk of intrastate
armed conﬂict, in all systems.
The claim in Hypothesis 4, of a compound eﬀect of size and inequality, can neither be
rejected nor conﬁrmed from the empirical investigation, due to the suspicion that the results
are driven by the structure in my data.
Chapter 6
The (minimal) eﬀect of proportional
systems
Do proportional election systems contribute in reducing the risk of armed conﬂict onset in
states where ethnic cleavages are salient? The empirical investigation undertaken supports
my overall proposition that they under some circumstances do. The estimates regarding
conditional eﬀects of PR systems on the risk of intrastate armed violence were signiﬁcant in
Model 1 and 3, but the result from Model 3 revealed an unanticipated direction of the eﬀect;
The result indicated that election systems help preserve peace in the case of relatively larger
groups, but in cases of high economic inequality, the estimates suggest that a majoritarian
system is more apt.
However, I contend that the main lesson, and the overarching answer to my research
question is that the magnitude of these eﬀects is negligible. This was clear from the values
for simulated ﬁrst diﬀerences, and from the model plots. How can this result be understood?
One interpretation of the empirical results is to point to ﬂaws in my models or biases in
data and operationalization. This interpretation was already discussed in section 5.4, and
I concluded that my design and operationalization are committed in a reasonably robust
manner. I therefore leave discussions on the statistical methods and the data behind now,
though I will put forth some suggestions for future research towards the end of the chapter.
The second interpretation is to consider the empirical results support for the null hy-
potheses  as proofs that the presence of a proportional election system does not matter
for intrastate peace in divided societies. Perhaps sharing power in the legislature does not
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help preserve the peace? This interpretation prompts a discussion of the theoretical and
real life implications of the statistical results. In the next section I attend to the task of
explaining more substantially what the results indicate. I then move on to discuss theoretical
implications, with an emphasis on inherent assumptions in theory on election systems, and
in my model.
6.1 Negligible eﬀects
To understand more fully what my results actually mean, the use of some simple counter-
factual experiments are helpful. First, I want to return to the problem of salient ethnic
cleavages.
From history we have seen the consequences of mismanagement of ethnic divisions. When
ethnic cleavages are not dealt with institutionally1, either because they are believed not be
a challenge, or simply ignored, majority rule with no accommodation has sometimes been
the institutional option. We have experienced such systems and their eﬀects in the cases
of South Africa and Sri Lanka (Coakley 2009). Such experiences from the past paired with
the knowledge of an increasingly democratic world, and the growing importance of political
formal institutions in less developed and ethnically divided countries, has stimulated research
on appropriate representative institutions.
The results from my empirical investigation lead me to believe that which type of election
system is used is not important in determining how peaceful divided countries will be. The
diﬀerences in terms of risk of conﬂict onset between majoritarian and proportional systems
are almost zero. Advocates of majoritarianism on the one hand, and proportional election
system on the other, lend the election system great importance in divided societies. I contend
that these theorists are too optimistic on the behalf of political electoral institutions. I have
tested mechanisms derived from the theories of authoritative ﬁgures in the institutional
literature, and I did so in a benign manner  by contending the eﬀects of election systems
depend on the salience of ethnic cleavages. If proportional systems reduce the risk of conﬂict
anywhere, it is where ethnic diﬀerences are salient, where there are ethnic conﬂicts to absorb
into politics. My benign test evidences that neither systems is superior and that any such
1Another extra-institutional option for regulating ethnic conﬂicts (apart from genocide and ethnocide)
is boundary change. This latter option falls outside the focus on institutions in this thesis (for reviews, see
McGary et al. 2008; Coakley 2009).
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reduction in risk of conﬂict is negligible.
In chapter 2 I brought attention to the ﬁrst civil war in Cote d'Ivoire. This case is
illustrative as to how minimal the eﬀects from Model 1 are. In 2002 rebels (the Mouvement
Patriotique de Cote d'Ivoire) stated that they were ﬁghting for the rights of the Muslim
majority in the north of Cote d'Ivoire, whom they perceived had been discriminated against
by the present government (Langer 2005). The Northerners were a group of considerable
demographic power, at approximately 0.4 on my scale. They were therefore, according to
my model, more at risk for rebellion (due to high pi, or probability of winning a war). A
majoritarian system was in eﬀect at the outbreak of the civil war. Would the probability of
civil war have been any lower, all else equal, if the conﬂicting groups were living under a PR
system? According to my statistical results, and a counterfactual assessment, the reduction
in probability of onset when moving from a majoritarian system to a PR system, while
holding all other variables at the observed values for Cote d'Ivoire in 2002, is the meagre
0.002 (0.2%). This estimate is not even separable from zero2 when taking the uncertainty of
the estimates into account.
The Northerners in Cote d'Ivoire also experienced some degree of negative economic
inequality. First diﬀerences simulated from Model 3, reveal that this group's probability of
onset would yield a change as low as -0.001 (best estimate) in expected value of onset when
moving from a majoritarian to a PR system. This is telling.
Another telling example is counterfactual Sudan. This country experienced a civil war
in 1983, a conﬂict that included ﬁghting between government forces and a plethora of ethnic
group aﬃliations, among these the Beja, Dinka, Nuba and Nuer. The election system was
majoritarian, and there were varying levels of economic inequality between groups. The
Dinka, for instance, was a medium size group experiencing high inequality, and in a sense
the most likely case, where PR system should reduce incentives to pick up arms. I plotted the
eﬀect estimated fromModel 1b across a range of values for demographic power, corresponding
to the observed range of demographic power balance for the warring groups in Sudan at the
outbreak of the civil war. Taking into account the uncertainty of the estimates3, the plots
for non-PR and PR respectively (Figure 6.1) reveal that the eﬀect of demographic power is
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Figure 6.1: Model 1: Counterfactual Dinka in Sudan




























































Figure 6.2: Model 3: Counterfactual Dinka in Sudan
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approximately the same between election systems.
Figure 6.2 depicts the eﬀect of negative economic inequality as evident from the result
in Model 3a. Here, there seems to be a substantial increase in risk of onset for larger values
of inequality, and the slope seems steeper for PR systems. However, the conﬁdence bands
reveal that the uncertainty of any such eﬀect is large. In sum, it is safe to say that the type
of election system did not matter in this counterfactual case. Similar results fro Model 1 and
3 are apparent for other ethnic groups and their expected values of intrastate armed conﬂict:
The changes in risk of conﬂict are clearly negligible.
The eﬀect of ethnic parties
An interesting ﬁnding on the side of my research question, is the eﬀect of laws against
the participation in legislative elections of ethnic or religious parties, a feature not often
investigated empirically. Theory suggests that the banning of parties is conducive to peace,
since it contributes to cross-cutting party politics (Lipset 1960), and lead to a reduction
of inter-ethnic conﬂict that would otherwise be exacerbated by an ethnicization of national
politics or the public institutional recognition of group identities that Horowitz (2003)
warns against.
My results reveal the opposite. Across all models and all speciﬁcations this is one of
the more consistent results. The eﬀect of banning ethnic parties is signiﬁcant and positive,
indicating that permissive laws regarding what parties are allowed to participate in the
contest for power, reduce ethnic tensions4.
Contrary to the contention that reducing the ethnic dimension of contest in politics, this
result may be interpreted as support for proportional election systems and accommodationist
perspectives: When ethnic groups are allowed to voice their ethnic or religious claims within
party politics, the danger of ethnic conﬂict is reduced. For instance, Lemarchand (2007:7)
argues that permitting ethnic parties is part of the explanation for a promising outlook for
Burundian politics; Here ethnic diﬀerences are explicitly recognized and power is shared
2The values at the lower and upper conﬁdence levels (2.5 and 97.5%) are -0.013 and 0.011.
395% conﬁdence is the area in light grey.
4My results regarding banning of parties must of course be treated with caution, as they are neither
suﬃciently theorized or investigated in terms of marginal eﬀects. However, when performing a minimal
investigation into the results regarding banned parties to the values for Cote d'Ivoire, the ﬁrst diﬀerence
measure 0.029 at the mean, with conﬁdence bands stretching from 0.015 to 0.066. These are still small
changes, but intrastate armed conﬂicts are rare events, and the ﬁrst diﬀerences are substantially higher than
those investigating the eﬀects of election systems.
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among ethnic parties.
6.2 The discrepancy between theory and ﬁndings
A third interpretation of the empirical results is that the uncertain and the non-conﬁrming
results is an indication that some assumptions often held in the political science literature are
false, and perhaps not as useful as we like to think. For instance: are institutions little more
than words on paper? Winding back to the theoretical model, and the assumptions that
were illuminated there, I use the theoretical assumptions as staring points for interpreting
the results, and eventually summing up an answer to my research question. The assumptions
behind my theoretical model are often implicit in theories on election systems and intrastate
peace, and addressing them explicitly is a ﬁrst step to approaching a better understanding of
the conﬂicting and often ambiguous results empirical political science provide to the question
of which electoral institutions are better suited for ethnically divided societies.
De facto political power
The ﬁrst of these assumptions concern the political outcomes from election systems: Does
the shape of de jure institutions give considerable de facto vestiges? To what degree do
proportional election system really contribute to proportionality in the legislature? Do we
see less political exclusion in proportional systems of elections? I already discussed this in
section 4.4 (page 50), and the bivariate distributions in my data did conﬁrm the assumption
that PR systems produce power-sharing in the legislature. Both the frequency of multi-party
systems and the proportionality of legislatures are higher for states with PR systems.
What I did not address, is exclusion from the executive. Do proportional legislatures
produce power sharing in the executive? Or will we ﬁnd just as high levels of de facto
political exclusion from the executive5 in proportional systems? Figure 6.3 depicts the rela-
tionship between electoral systems and executive exclusion, and no distinct pattern stands
out between the types. The greater rectangle belongs to the category for excluded group in
autocratic majoritarian systems, which supports the notion that majoritarianism is a more
exclusive system. But at the same time, plural systems (to the very left) seem to produce
relatively little exclusion. There is therefore no clear divide between the two aggregated
5Exclusion is deﬁned as holding not even a junior role in the executive branch (Cederman et al. 2011:484).
6.2. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THEORY AND FINDINGS 85
election system types in terms of exclusion from the executive.
Of course, the rectangles in the ﬁgure are frequencies only and we do not know if these
similarities across systems are due to other and omitted factors. Nevertheless, the ﬁgure
give an indication that also under PR election systems a large number of ethnic groups
can be excluded altogether from executive power. This is a qualiﬁcation to the assumption
underlying consociational theory, that PR systems produce broad executive coalitions. The
failure to test this assumption may drive inconclusive results regarding the eﬀects of election
systems. A viable way forward is investigating into which groups, and why, are excluded
form executive power, and whether this exclusion is persistent or erratic.
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Figure 6.3: Excluded groups by election system and regime type. 1972-2005.
Economic policies and election systems
My empirical investigation provided strong support for the claim that economic inequality
increases probability of intrastate armed conﬂict onset, which was the ﬁrst part of hypothesis
3. The rather puzzling result is that the negative conditional eﬀect of PR systems and
economic inequality is either absent or quite weak. For some levels of inequality PR systems
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were suggested to increase the risk of conﬂict. This calls for an evaluation of the conjecture
that proportional systems spend more on broad programs and that this should dampen the
frustration of being economically deprived.
Theory presumes PR systems invoke the conviction that economic diﬀerences will dimin-
ish in the future. The ﬁrst part of the assumption, regarding the distribution of resources,
is theoretically convincing, and supported by empirical work or recent date (Persson and
Tabellini 2003; Knutsen 2011). The qualiﬁcation here regards the second part of the as-
sumption; That proportionality will dampen the frustration over a disparaged economic
status quo.
The bivariate distributions of inequality and PR systems supported the notion that there
is less economic inequality under PR systems. This however, is no support for the claim
that inequality causes less frustration under proportionality. Perhaps the static measure
for economic inequality is inadequate in capturing the causal mechanisms proposed? If a
deprived group's economic situation does not change over time for the better under PR, than
there is no reason to assume they will remain content under the system. The net utility of
the electoral institution might diminish.
The often mentioned concern that majoritarian systems have greater accountability, and
therefore are more apt to produce economic development in the short term, is one tentative
explanation corresponding to the, at ﬁrst sight, puzzling ﬁndings from Model 3. There might
be a built-in bias in favour of the status quo in proportional systems. The larger the number
of parties with distinct policy positions, the harder the process of passing fundamentally new
legislation (Tsebelis 2002). My empirical results from Model 3 shows that larger values of
economic inequality is associated with a greater increase in the risk of onset under PR systems
than under majoritarianism. If PR systems produce more conservative economic policies,
hinging on broad political consensus, then economic deprivation may be more persistent, as
the politics of the status quo never challenge the prevailing economic order of a society.
Adding to this, where the promise of redistribution that PR entails is not complied with
in practice, frustration will conceivably reach even higher levels than under majoritarian
systems where such promises are void.
An alternative explanation, is the tentative answer provided by the results from the
combined regression model (Model 4): Economic inequality is a greater risk to peace under
PR systems than under majoritarian systems, but only when considered separately from
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measures of the sizes of groups. Larger groups have lower opportunity costs associated with
rebellion under PR systems than under majoritarian systems. Therefore simplistic statistical
models risk failing to reveal any true conditional eﬀect of PR systems. However, until we
can provide with data that is suﬃcient for such data-challenging multifaceted relationships,
this is only an ad hoc explanation to the somewhat incognizable statistical results in Model
3 and their relation to the results in Model 4.
Elections as censuses
The third assumption I would like to discuss is the elections as censuses proposition and
the contention that policy spaces are one-dimensional  that voters in divided societies vote
strictly based on group membership, as a consequence of the main conﬂicts in society being
ethnic. The simplifying assumption that seats in parliament are allocated on the basis of
the sizes of groups is what underlines the PR-voter theorem after Reynal-Querol (2001) (see
equation 3.4 page 27). The assumption is also inherent in theories on election systems in
divided societies, and in a wider sense, the accommodationist school of thought on election
systems.
If voters care strongly for more than one political dimension, the ethnic make-up of a
country will not solely determine the composition of the legislature. The question really
comes down to whether or not members of ethnic groups pass their vote based on shared
ethnicity, and not based on some other political aﬃliations and convictions.
The contention that ethnic parties will be a threat to stability is derived from the belief
in elections as censuses. If economic issues cross-cut ethnic party aﬃliations, then we can
expect inter-party alliances and coalitions, not the polarized pluralism feared by Horowitz.
Of course, the importance of ethnicity is crucial where the state has yet to become a nation.
Also, the existence of institutional rules can plausibly be assumed to reduce the number
of issue dimensions in policyspace. In this sense, the policy space may be close to uni-
dimensional in some cases. However, to hold this a universal assumption is rather coarse,
and might explain the results in this thesis and elsewhere.
Further, in cases where there is large intra-group inequality, we can expect the members
of ethnic groups to reveal less homogeneous preferences. Especially if ethnic elites are not
experiencing horizontal inequalities, then this might signiﬁcantly reduce the risk of violent
group mobilization, also where there are horizontal inequalities between groups; where the
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masses of the ethnic group perceive they are deprived economically or politically. The
elites, those normally considered to hold the resources necessary to mobilize for rebellion,
might be better of under the status quo, and lack incentives for mobilization. Some claim
that the politicization of ethnicity hinges on political entrepreneurs who play crucial roles in
the mobilization of protest (Roeder 1991:202). The incentives of such entrepreneurs do not
always align with the incentives of the ethnic masses.
Some even conceive of elites as necessary actors not only for ethnic mobilization, but also
for ethnic identity formation (Roeder 1991). Others argue that ethnic groups are important
in and of themselves, and that ethnicity is a temporally stable marker of group coherence
and mobilization. Most people do not have the choice to switch identities, and inequalities
among groups can become a source of unhappiness and resentment, and a cause of social
instability (Stewart and House 2002:8). I have relied on the latter conception of ethnicity
in my modelling, and the contention that the experience of political inclusion will dampen
frustrations from economic inequalities. If what is crucial for ethnic mobilization and conﬂict
is the salience of elite cleavages, then this might explain the minimality of eﬀects uncovered.
Election systems and regime type
If electoral institutions are nothing but words on paper, then the conditional eﬀects discov-
ered in this analysis are spurious. However, such a critique is not a big threat, as political
institutions are becoming more important, even in African politics where informal institu-
tions have been resilient to institutional reforms. Posner and Young (2007:126), for example,
conclude that the formal rules of the game are beginning to matter, suggesting that elites
are increasingly adhering to formal political institutions. We can expect electoral institutions
to play a substantial role, also in states that are not considered democratic in the literature.
Nevertheless, the regime type is of course crucial when discussing the eﬀect of electoral
institutions, since these will not have the same consequences in democracies and autocracies.
Autocratic political institutions are considered very diﬀerent from democratic institutions.
While democratic institutions are often built on the normative ground of securing account-
ability or representativity , and providing checks on political leadership, the widespread
assumption is that autocratic institutions sometimes have the opposite eﬀects. Elections in
authoritarian regimes are perceived as choreographed events, with little real-world impact.
In autocracies candidates are instructed and monitored, and outcomes are often determined
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through ballot-box stuﬃng and manipulation (Lust-Okar 2006:457).
This view on autocratic institutions is however contested, and case evidence from for
instance Jordan, suggest that elections in autocratic regimes can provide an important arena
for competition over state resources. To solicit cooperation or avoid rebellion, autocrats use
policy concessions and distribution of spoils. While the second option requires little, working
out policy concessions requires an institutional setting  such as legislatures (Gandhi and
Przeworski 2007:1282). Parliament becomes, among other things, a basis from which one can
call upon ministers and bureaucrats to allocate jobs to constituents (Lust-Okar 2006:459).
Statistical studies have shown that authoritarian electoral systems help stabilize and
hence increase the survival of non-democratic regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Specif-
ically, partisan legislatures in autocracies can incorporate potential opposition forces, and
by this invest them with a stake in the ruler's survival6. The autocratic, communist regime
in Poland, for example, when challenged by the force of organized workers, attempted to en-
capsulate the opposition, by introducing a more inclusive election system. This way electoral
institution in autocracies can in fact help secure the power base of the ruler. Proportional
measures in autocratic elections can broaden the basis of support for the regime, and lengthen
the tenure of an autocrat (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). At the same time, autocratic pro-
portionality opens up to more inclusive politics. We can therefore speak of proportional
election systems in autocracies7, though the autocratic version diﬀers from democratic pro-
portionalism in key respects.
When I ran regressions on democracies only no considerable eﬀects of election systems
were apparent (see table 5.7). This is partly the result of the fact that there are very few
intrastate armed onsets in consolidated democracies (even using the procedural measure for
democracy as employed here), producing uncertain estimates, but might also indicate that
autocratic institutions have diﬀerent eﬀects from democratic.
The regression result for democracies might also mirror how election systems can have
6Geddes (1999) investigated empirically the diﬀerences across types of authoritarian regimes and the
risk of regime breakdown. She argues that the reason why single-party regimes often last longer can be
traced back to how they respond to economic shocks and to endogenous sources of instability. Through the
allocation of educational opportunities, jobs, and positions in government, single parties can typically claim
the acquiescence of many of the most able, ambitious, and upwardly mobile individuals in society, especially
those from peasant and urban marginal backgrounds (Geddes 1999:134).
7McGary et al. (2008) for instance, states that consociations can be both democratic and undemocratic.
One instance that can be deﬁned as an undemocratic proportional system is Yugoslavia, where communist
elites from each ethnic group controlled the federal governments, but were not elected democratically.
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diﬀerent consequences between young and old democracies. Some claim that majoritarian
or plurality systems may be best in terms of promoting eﬀective representation and de-
mocratization in developing or emerging democracies. Also democratization is a long-term
process that may require diﬀerent electoral systems at diﬀerent stages, and PR systems may
ﬁt mature democracies better than they ﬁt the young ones (Meisburger 2012:155). One
policy-suggestions for the new South Sudanese election systems for example stress that a
government that does not shoulder a reasonable amount of accountability for its performance
will leave a lot to be desired (Gerenge 2012).
6.3 Conclusion
The de jure electoral system only make up one part of the institutional setup of a country.
Indeed, in assessing this institution alone, and not investigating into the geographical disper-
sion of power, the judicial and economic institutions, the whole story cannot be told. Also,
institutions do not always deliver what they promise, as discussed in the previous section.
The assumptions inherent in conﬂict regulation theory, theories on election systems, and in
my model can be questioned on the ground of being too simplistic. This is the caveat of
quantitative research on rare phenomenons: Everything cannot be taken into account. In
constructing my theoretical model, and discussing its assumptions, I have illuminated some
of the unknowns.
Strong claims have been made as to the merits of electoral systems. This thesis pro-
vides some leverage in understanding the role of election systems where ethnic cleavages are
salient. The results from the particular regression models indicate directions of relationships,
and a partial support for my theoretical model. However, directions per se are not very in-
teresting, unless the eﬀects have substantive meaning. The closer investigation of the actual
implications presented in this chapter, uncovers the response to my research questions: The
marginal eﬀects of election systems are negligible, contrary to the claims of the advocates of
both majoritarianism and proportionalism for divided societies. My benign test evidences
that neither the majoritarian nor the proportional election system is superior; Any reduction
in risk of ethnic armed conﬂict induced by the election systems is negligible.
My conclusion here indicates that scholars should be cautious in universally recommend-
ing proportional systems as an outright remedy for lasting peace. A policy recommendation
6.3. CONCLUSION 91
that can be aired on the basis of my ﬁndings is that institutional and economic measures
to prevent horizontal economic inequality to rise or take hold should be extant. Inequality
is shown to increase the risk of intrastate armed conﬂict under any system. Horizontal eco-
nomic inequality is on the rise, and curbing this rise through institutional or policy reforms
might be one viable approach worth pursuing. My results therefore indicate that any at-
tempt to assist new democracies in state and institution building must take the distribution
of economic resources into account.
I found that a banning of parties increase the risk of onset. This draws up a dichotomy of
institutional setups not investigated fully here. Closer inspection into my tentative ﬁndings
and a more nuanced theoretical discussion of causal mechanisms could yield new insights.
My results suggest that accommodationist theories might have explanatory power when it
comes to the role of ethnicity in party politics. Is it so that an exclusion of ethnic concerns
from the arena of party politics boosts an embrace of more violent ethnic expressions?
My result regarding horizontal economic inequality supports earlier work on horizontal
inequality, and suggests that the investigation of institutions and any solution they may oﬀer
to remedy economic inequality is important. An interesting avenue of research here is the
relationship between election systems and changes in economic inequality. Unfortunately,
no well-developed data on change in economic horizontal inequality are readily available, to
my knowledge. Providing yearly measures for group wealth as an extension of the Ethnic
Power Relations data is a challenge worth undertaking for the research community.
This thesis has provided some new insights to the research on ethnic armed conﬂict.
I have unpacked the central theoretical concept divided societies and theories on election
systems into distinct theoretical parameters, mechanisms and expectations. My empirical
investigation evidences that proponents of proportional election systems as peace preserving,
are too optimistic, and that neither majoritarian nor proportional election systems seem to
inﬂuence the probability of intrastate armed conﬂict by much.
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The dataset (the original datasets, my merged data and the imputed version) and the R-code
are available on request. E-mail: heggedal@gmail.com.
Lists of groups in conﬂict and countries
Table A.1: Armed conﬂict onsets
Year Ethnic group Country










1979 Sunni Arabs Syria
1980 Indigenous Peoples Liberia
1980 Basques Spain
1981 Zulu South Africa
1981 Xhosa South Africa
1981 Far North-West Nile (Kakwa-Nubian, Madi, Lugbara, Alur) Uganda
1982 Manipuri India
1982 Shi'a Arabs Iraq
1982 Maronite Christians Lebanon
1982 Baganda Uganda
1983 Punjabi-Sikhs (non-SC/ST/OBCs) India
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Table A.1: Armed conﬂict onsets
Year Ethnic group Country
1983 Sri Lankan Tamils Sri Lanka
1983 Beja Sudan




1984 Fulani (and other northern Muslim peoples) Cameroon
1984 Kurds Turkey
1986 Ewe (and related groups) Togo





1989 Assamese (non-SC/ST/OBCs) India
1989 Achinese Indonesia




1991 Muslim Arakanese Myanmar
1991 Basques Spain






1992 East Timorese Indonesia
1992 Transnistrians Moldova
1993 Croats Bosnia and Herzegovina
1994 Whites (Tuareg and Arabs) Mali











Table A.1: Armed conﬂict onsets
Year Ethnic group Country
1996 Somali (Ogaden) Ethiopia
1996 Mons Myanmar
1996 Ethnic communities (later Adivasi/Janajati) Nepal








2002 Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) Cote d'Ivoire
2004 Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur) Cote d'Ivoire
2004 Ijaw Nigeria
In table A.1 all the ethnic armed conﬂict onsets in the sample are listed in chronological
order from 1972 to 2005. In table A.2 all countries in the data are reported along with key
values on independent variables.
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Table A.2: List of ethnically divided countries by economic status and number of onsets
Country lineq2 GDP cap Onsets
Russia 3.24 10051.07 4
Nigeria 1.46 1102.29 1
Thailand 1.43 4865.99 0
United Kingdom 1.21 18854.68 0
Indonesia 1.15 2700.28 6
Yugoslavia 0.96 2635.55 1
South Africa 0.79 7601.66 2
Sudan 0.58 1096.79 5
Iran 0.47 5827.04 2
Peru 0.36 4444.56 0
Central African Republic 0.34 861.19 0
Vietnam 0.31 1665.82 0
Turkey 0.31 3563.56 1
India 0.25 1772.46 5
Chile 0.22 9846.80 0
Ecuador 0.22 4538.43 0
Cameroon 0.22 2501.56 1
Angola 0.16 1091.17 1
Philippines 0.16 3293.19 1
Zimbabwe 0.15 3205.61 0
Namibia 0.14 5036.76 0
Kyrgyzstan 0.14 3439.17 0
Zambia 0.13 1147.96 0
Croatia 0.13 1
Pakistan 0.10 1989.89 1
Ukraine 0.07 6096.49 0
Canada 0.07 20973.88 0
Kenya 0.06 1247.76 0
Mexico 0.05 6926.04 1
Bangladesh 0.05 1731.81 2
Afghanistan 0.04 1523.40 9
Spain 0.04 15569.46 3
Democratic Republic of the Congo 0.03 1088.52 0
Ethiopia 0.03 631.92 5
Chad 0.03 875.06 0
United States of America 0.03 26028.87 0
Syria 0.02 1812.52 1
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.02 2694.67 1
Mozambique 0.02 1115.70 0
Kazakhstan 0.02 8242.99 0
Yemen 0.02 1021.30 1
Niger 0.02 843.09 1
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Table A.2: List of ethnically divided countries by economic status and number of onsets
Country lineq2 GDP cap Onsets
Sri Lanka 0.01 2645.58 1
Lithuania 0.01 9045.74 0
Kuwait 0.01 30715.30 0
Bulgaria 0.01 7266.72 0
Benin 0.01 1166.60 0
Malaysia 0.01 7070.44 0
Bolivia 0.01 2812.51 0
Myanmar 0.01 1084.60 3
Madagascar 0.01 844.45 0
Macedonia 0.01 5016.40 0
Senegal 0.01 1432.89 0
Colombia 0.00 5158.18 0
Belarus 0.00 9774.26 0
Iraq 0.00 2565.06 3
Uganda 0.00 863.81 3
Cote d'Ivoire 0.00 2155.80 2
Brazil 0.00 6786.93 0
Slovakia 0.00 9622.70 0
Switzerland 0.00 25374.39 0
Uzbekistan 0.00 3567.21 0
Laos 0.00 1269.58 0
Togo 0.00 925.46 2
Algeria 0.00 5423.87 0
Ghana 0.00 1260.86 0
Czechoslovakia 0.00 11798.89 0
Nepal 0.00 1291.16 1
Mauritania 0.00 1389.51 0
Belgium 0.00 19322.37 0
Finland 0.00 17837.19 0
Paraguay 0.00 4643.53 0
Cambodia 0.00 566.83 0
Gambia 0.00 904.89 0
Sierra Leone 0.00 783.05 0
Guinea 0.00 2440.19 0
Malawi 0.00 780.38 0
Tajikistan 0.00 2059.21 1
Liberia 0.00 1130.98 1
Moldova 0.00 2653.56 1
Egypt 0.00 3200.16 0
Lebanon 0.00 4043.09 1
Mali 0.00 962.99 2
Romania 0.00 5305.96 0
108 APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Table A.2: List of ethnically divided countries by economic status and number of onsets
Country lineq2 GDP cap Onsets
Taiwan 0.00 10677.41 0
New Zealand 0.00 17647.19 0
Congo 0.00 2232.29 0
Trinidad and Tobago 0.00 11208.33 0
Guatemala 0.00 3758.78 0
Venezuela 0.00 7010.76 0
Haiti 0.00 2038.76 0
Israel 0.00 16796.48 0
Japan 0.00 14070.29 0
Morocco 0.00 3350.72 0
Netherlands 0.00 22043.74 0
Imputations
Figure A.1 shows the densities of continuous variables after imputations. We see that the
densities become more centered from imputations.
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Figure A.1: Densityplot. Original data in black lines, and imputed data grey
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Appendix B
Robustness and additional ﬁgures
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
PR.mixed 0.32 (0.88) 2.73 (2.77) −2.28 (1.07)∗∗
b 3.01 (3.33) 1.67 (3.16)
b2 −2.84 (3.79) −1.74 (3.46)
lineq2 1.69 (0.50)∗∗∗ 1.73 (0.49)∗∗∗
lgdpcapl −0.88 (0.53)∗ −1.41 (0.59)∗∗ −0.91 (0.53)∗
log.pop −0.35 (0.19)∗ −0.33 (0.16)∗∗ −0.31 (0.20)
banned 0.44 (0.51) 0.18 (0.49) 0.62 (0.52)
democracy −0.36 (0.56) −0.53 (0.58) −0.25 (0.56)
year 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02)









AIC 819.15 812.85 814.82
BIC 1546.71 1526.81 1549.19
Log Likelihood -302.57 -301.42 -299.41
Deviance 605.15 602.85 598.82
Num. obs. 6632 6632 6632
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Table B.2: Fixed eﬀects models
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4
(Intercept) 10.29 (25.16) −11.38 (27.67) −14.58 (27.81) −15.42 (27.67)
PR.mixed 1.04 (0.45) −0.65 (0.60) 0.63 (1.32) 0.08 (0.69)
b 1.36 (1.72) 0.44 (1.57) −0.60 (2.75)
b2 −1.18 (2.07) −0.85 (1.89) 0.05 (3.57)
lineq2 1.03 (0.25) 1.09 (0.24)
lgdpcapl −0.73 (0.17) −0.72 (0.18) −0.75 (0.17) −0.64 (0.17)
pyrs −0.02 (0.01) −0.02 (0.01) −0.03 (0.01) −0.02 (0.01)
year 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
log.pop 0.04 (0.10) 0.11 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11)
PR.mixed:b −4.18 (3.55) 6.96 (7.22)
PR.mixed:b2 2.27 (4.55) −20.57 (12.32)
low 0.40 (0.25) 0.02 (0.30)
high 0.40 (0.31)
banned 0.78 (0.30) 0.67 (0.29) 0.66 (0.30)








AIC 800.91 796.59 796.88 800.60
Log Likelihood -388.46 -384.30 -387.44 -382.30
Num. obs. 6632 6632 6632 6632
Num. groups: country 95 95 95 95
Variance: country.(Intercept) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
Variance: Residual
Signiﬁcance stars not reported
Table B.3: Random eﬀects models

















































































Figure B.2: Model 1c





























































Table B.4: Replication of Cederman et al. (2011) models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 348.840 (83.104)∗∗∗ 427.061 (94.174)∗∗∗ 424.459 (94.556)∗∗∗ 416.822 (93.996)∗∗∗
lineq2 0.658 (0.203)∗∗∗ 1.707 (0.372)∗∗∗ 1.705 (0.364)∗∗∗
b 3.774 (2.218)∗ 3.472 (2.642) 5.674 (2.775)∗∗ 5.900 (2.810)∗∗
b2 −4.926 (3.159) −5.579 (3.846) −7.590 (4.063)∗ −7.990 (4.153)∗
lgdpcapl −0.468 (0.170)∗∗∗ −0.857 (0.221)∗∗∗ −0.883 (0.224)∗∗∗ −0.907 (0.228)∗∗∗
exclgrps −0.012 (0.018) −0.037 (0.028) −0.051 (0.029)∗ −0.050 (0.029)∗
year −0.175 (0.042)∗∗∗ −0.213 (0.047)∗∗∗ −0.212 (0.047)∗∗∗ −0.208 (0.047)∗∗∗
pyrs −0.038 (0.092) 0.114 (0.105) 0.122 (0.105) 0.128 (0.106)
spline1 0.001 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001)∗ 0.002 (0.001)∗∗ 0.003 (0.001)∗∗
spline2 0.000 (0.001) −0.001 (0.001) −0.002 (0.001)∗ −0.002 (0.001)∗
spline3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
excluded 1.260 (0.382)∗∗∗ 1.301 (0.391)∗∗∗
low 1.112 (0.241)∗∗∗
high 1.066 (0.277)∗∗∗
AIC 554.656 410.418 399.914 401.282
BIC 629.129 479.567 475.349 483.003
Log Likelihood -266.328 -194.209 -187.957 -187.641
Deviance 532.656 388.418 375.914 375.282
Num. obs. 6440 3969 3969 3969
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Robust, country clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Temporal range: 1991 - 2005.
Model 1 is based on data for all groups, and models 2 - 5 on data on groups > 500.000.
Replication of Cederman et al. (2011)
Table B.4 presents the results from replicating some of Cederman et al.'s (2011) main models.
The result are very similar to the results from Cederman et. al's article. The small diﬀerences
between the coeﬃcient estimates reported here and in their article can be attributed to
diﬀerences in the matrix inversion routines implemented in R and Stata (Imai et al. 2007:513).

